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UNIVERSITY OF

COLORADO LAW REVIEW
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2007

THE COLORADO CONSTITUTION IN THE
NEW CENTURY
RICHARD B. COLLINS*

TABOR, gay marriage,pit bulls, guns, redistricting, ethics
in government, school vouchers, and minimum wage have
been on Colorado's constitutional agenda for the past seven
years. Dale Oesterle and I authored a book-length study of
the Colorado Constitution through 2001.1 This article reviews amendments and judicial decisions arising since. It
should surprise no one that TABOR has generated by far the
most decisions.

I.

AMENDMENTS

During the past half-century, Colorado voters approved
numerous amendments to the Colorado Constitution. 2 20012005 saw the adoption of but one major amendment, the 2002
addition of article XXVIII governing campaign finance. A 2004
amendment raising tobacco taxes 3 would have been a legislative matter in most states but was constitutionalized by the

* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. Matthew Niznik, class of 2006,
Edward Hafer, class of 2008, and Emily Holmes, class of 2009, provided valuable
research assistance.
1. DALE A. OESTERLE & RICHARD B. COLLINS, THE COLORADO STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (2002). The book's coverage ended in mid2001.
2. See Colo. Legislative Council, Chronological Listing of Ballot Issues,
http://www.leg.state.co.us/Ics/ballothistory.nsf (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
3. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 21. The measure raised the cigarette sales tax,
imposed a new "tobacco products tax," and exempted proceeds from revenue limits
of TABOR. Id. § 21(2)-(4).
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Taxpayers' Bill of Rights (TABOR).4 The amendment also requires that the tax's proceeds be spent only for designated
health-related purposes. 5 By contrast, 2006 was a busy year.
Voters added article XXIX, which severely restricts gifts to
public officials and employees and their families and contractors; article II, section 31, which limits marriage to unions of
one man and one woman; and article XVIII, section 15, which
raised and indexed the state's minimum wage. 6 They also extended a property tax exemption to disabled veterans. 7 Other
adopted amendments since 2001 were essentially housekeeping
8
measures.
A.

Article II, Section 31. Marriage

Colorado statutory law defines marriage as a union between one man and one woman, thereby failing to recognize
same-sex or polygamous marriages. 9 However, in lawsuits
brought by same-sex couples, courts in other jurisdictions have
invoked state constitutions to overturn similar laws. 10 These

4. Id. § 20(4)(a), (7) (requiring voter consent for tax increase and for exemption from revenue limits). Compliance with TABOR did not require a constitutional amendment but did require a statewide vote. Id. § 20(4)(a). However, the
measure's other provisions, directing spending of tax proceeds, required a freestanding initiative. Other TABOR issues are discussed infra, text at notes 247394.
5. Id. § 21(5), (7). The amendment also provided that revenues derived from
the measure not supplant other health-related revenues appropriated on the
measure's effective date. Id. § 21(6). However, the 2004 General Assembly, anticipating passage of the measure but wishing to retain its budget control, appropriated no money for enumerated health purposes. Proponents of the amendment
sued, but the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the legislature. Colo. Cmty.
Health Network v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 166 P.3d 280 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). Proponents earlier failed to obtain direct review in the Colorado Supreme Court under Colorado Appellate Rule 50. Colo. Cmty. Health Network v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, No. 05SC870, 2006 Colo. LEXIS 133 (Colo. Feb. 13, 2006).
6. COLO. CONST. art. XXIX; art. II, § 31; art. XVIII, § 15.
7. See COLO. CONST. art. X, § 3.5.
8. See COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 8.7 (authorizing legislature to set qualifications for county coroners); 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 2955-57 (repealing obsolete provisions); 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 2745-46 (same); 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 3094-3101
(same). Each of these was referred to the ballot by the legislature.
9. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104(1)(b) (2007).
10. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Goodridge v. Dep't. of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999);
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia
courts held that denial of same-sex marriage violated the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. See, e.g., Halpern v. Toronto, [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161. The
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cases induced Colorado's opponents of same-sex marriage to
initiate a constitutional definition in 2006, and their proposal
In the same election, voters rejected a statuwas adopted."1
tory referendum to authorize civil partnerships for same-sex
couples. 12 There is some incongruity in placing this and like
measures that restrict equality in article II, the Colorado Bill of
Rights, but the initiative process allows proponents to choose
13
where to insert amendments into the Constitution.
B. Article X, Section 3.5. Homestead Exemption
Section 3.5 was added in 2000 to reduce the property tax
on residences for qualified homeowners 65 years of age or
older. 14 Tax on the first $200,000 of actual value is halved, and
the state must reimburse local governments for their reduced

decisions could have been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, but the
Prime Minister announced that instead the government would introduce legislation to legalize same-sex marriage. See Susan Munroe, Canada to Make SameONLINE,
Legal,
CANADA
Sex
Marriages
(last
visited
http://canadaonline.about.com/cs/samesex/a/samesexmarrleg.htm
Aug. 28, 2007). He then referred to the supreme court the question whether such
legislation would be constitutional (the reverse of the question decided by the
lower courts), and the court held that it would be valid. In re Same Sex Marriage,
[2004] 3 S.C.R 698. The court carefully avoided stating a viewpoint on the correctness of the lower court decisions. See id. at 701. In 2005, the Canadian Parliament amended the marriage law (a national issue under the Canadian Constitution) to legalize gay marriage. Civil Marriage Act, R.S.C., ch. 33 (2005).
11. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31.
12. Referendum I. See 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 2933-42 (placing Referendum I
on the ballot); Colo. Legislative Council, Colorado Ballot Proposal Information,
http://www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf (click "2006"; click "Referendum")
(Referendum I failed, 47% for, 52% against) (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
13. Neither the governing constitutional provision, COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1,
nor statutes carrying it out, COLO. REV. STAT. tit. 1, art. 40 (2007), have any provision stating who decides where an initiative creating a new law will be located
in the constitution or statutes. The practice is that during statutory review processes, the Legislative Council and Office of Legislative Legal Services may suggest
a location to initiators, but the ultimate decision is left to them. See Email from
Stephanie Cegielski, Legal Specialist, Colorado Dept. of State (Apr. 22, 2007) (on
file with author). For other instances of initiated restrictions on equality in article II, see COLO. CONST. art. II § 30b, forbidding laws providing for equal rights
for gays, held to violate the federal Constitution in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996), and COLO. CONST. art. II § 30a, making English the official language of
Colorado. However, there is no other article of the Colorado Constitution that is
an obvious place for these provisions.
14. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 236-37. To qualify, seniors
must have owned and occupied their homes for the preceding ten years.

1268

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

revenue. 15 The legislature can raise or lower the $200,000 cap,
and it used this power in 2003 to suspend the entire reduction
during the economic downturn of 2003-05.16 The same statute
restored the reduction up to $200,000 in value for 2006, and in
the latter year, 17 voters amended Section 3.5 to extend the
18
benefit to disabled veterans.
C. Article XVIII, Section 15. State Minimum Wage
Colorado has had statutory minimum wage legislation
since 1917,19 but until 1977, it applied only to women and chil-1
2
dren. 20 In the latter year, it was extended to most workers.
It provides for the Director of the Colorado Division of Labor to
22
determine "the minimum wages sufficient for living wages."
Colorado's statutory minimum wage was last raised in 1997 to
match the federal minimum that became effective that year,
23
$5.15 per hour.
In 2006, voters initiated and approved a constitutional
minimum wage of $6.85 per hour to be adjusted annually for
inflation based on "the Consumer Price Index used for Colorado." 24 It is to be paid to anyone eligible for the federal or
state statutory minimum wages, and the measure restricts the
25
amount of tip income that can be offset against the minimum.
The state does not determine any consumer price index,
and the federal government does not calculate a consumer price
index for Colorado, but its greater Denver index "is often used

15. Id.
16. 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws 1476-77 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-3-203(1)
(2007)).
17. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-3-203(1) (2007).
18. See 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 2953 (codified at COLO. CONST. art. X, § 3.5).
19. See 1917 Colo. Sess. Laws 380-90 (codified as amended in COLO. REV.
STAT. tit. 8, art. 6 (2007)).
20. See id..
21.
1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 428-32 (codified as amended in COLO. REV. STAT.
tit. 8, art. 6 (2007)).
22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-6-106 (2007). Determination of the wage rate is
made pursuant to § 8-6-109.
23. See Colorado Minimum Wage Order No. 22, 7 COLO. CODE. REGS. § 1103-1
(2007).
24. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 15.
25. Id. The offset is limited to $3.02 per hour, and this figure is not indexed
for inflation. Therefore, the minimum wage for workers who receive tip income is
set at $3.83 per hour, adjusted for inflation in the same way as the minimum for
other workers.
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as a proxy." 26 Also, the federal greater Denver index is used to
measure inflation under TABOR, 27 under the Campaign and
Political Finance amendment, 28 and under the new Standards
of Conduct in Government amendment. 29 The statute implementing the new wage measure delegated the choice of index
and other details to the Director of the State Division of Labor, 30 and the Director announced that the greater Denver in31
dex will be used.
D.

Article XXVIII-Campaign and PoliticalFinance

1.

History

Campaign finance regulation is a triangular war among
proponents of restrictions, those who claim that restrictions are
unconstitutional denials of free speech, and members of the
General Assembly bent on reelection. In 1974, the General Assembly passed a Campaign Reform Act that set modest limits
on campaign contributions and adopted requirements for accountability and disclosure. 32 In 1996, voters approved a
statutory initiative that replaced most of the 1974 law with
much stricter rules. 33 Key features of the 1996 measure were
severe limits on contributions to candidates and committees
($100 to $500 per person), prohibitions on contributions by cor26. See
Colo.
Legislative
Council,
Consumer
Price
Index,
http://www.state.co.us/gov dirfleg.dir/lcsstaff/lcs/EconCPI.pdf.
27. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(2)(f).
28. Id. art. XXVIII, § 3(13) (indexing contribution limits). On this amendment generally, see infra text at notes 32-63.
29. COLO. CONST. art. XXIX, § 3(6) (indexing $50 cap on gifts to public officers, employees, and contractors). On this amendment generally, see infra text at
notes 64-100.
30. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-6-106, 8-6-108.5 (2007).
31. See Department of Labor and Employment, Minimum Wage Fact Sheet,
Jan. 2007, http://www.coworkforce.com/lab/MinimumWageFactSheet.pdf.
The
Fact Sheet does say that the information is subject to revision.
32. 1974 Colo. Sess. Laws 261-70.
33. 1996 Initiative 15 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-45-101
to 118 (2007)). For the original text, see Legislative Council, Colo. Gen. Assembly,
Text of Amendment 15, http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/96bp/text15.html
(last visited Aug. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Text of Amendment 15]. The 1974 statute
had been amended, most recently during the General Assembly's 1996 session. To
compare the statute as amended in 1996 with its initiated replacement, see Legislative Council, Colo. Gen. Assembly, Analysis of 1996 Ballot Proposals, Amendment 15, http://www.state.co.us/govdir/leg_dir/96bp/amdl5.html (last visited
Aug. 15, 2007).
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porations and labor unions, and voluntary limits on campaign
spending. 34 The initiative also renewed restrictions on using
public money or other resources to influence the outcome of
35
elections.
First Amendment challenges were immediately filed in
federal district court. The court sustained most of the voluntary spending provision, 36 but in 1999 it invalidated the basic
contribution limits as too low to satisfy federal free speech
standards. 37 While appeals were pending, the General Assembly unwisely repealed all of the contribution limits, including
those held valid by the court, and replaced them with much
higher limits-$1000 to $5000 per person. 3 8 The voluntary
spending provision that the court had largely sustained was
also repealed, as was the prohibition on corporate and labor
contributions to candidates. 39 The U. S. Court of Appeals then
overturned restrictions on corporations as applied to organiza40
tions that promoted issues rather than candidates.
Proponents of restrictions countered with the constitu41
tional initiative adopted in 2002, adding article XXVIII.
Drafters of the amendment made some changes to try to meet
the judicial objections cited above. Contribution limits range
from $200 to $500 for individual donors and are indexed for in-

34. See Text of Amendment 15, supra note 33.
35. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-117 (2007). The 1976 statute had a like prohibition that explicitly forbade contributions in kind, while the 1996 measure forbids
only "contributions." In Colorado Common Cause v. Coffman, 102 P.3d 999 (Colo.
2004), the court interpreted the 1996 measure to continue the ban on in-kind
commitments of resources. In Skruch v. Highlands Ranch MetropolitanDistricts
Nos. 3 & 4, 107 P.3d 1140 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), the court held that special districts had violated the section. The provision was not changed by adoption of article XXVIII.
36. Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Buckley, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17247,
at *22 (D. Colo. Apr. 17, 1998).
37. Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Buckley, 60
F. Supp. 2d 1066 (D. Colo. 1999), vacated in part as moot, dismissed in part and
rev'd in part, 236 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2000). The issues to which the text refers
were vacated because of the passage of the statute described infra at note 38.
38. 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 118-29.

39. Id.
40. Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Buckley,
236 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2000). This decision relied on a Colorado Supreme Court
interpretation of the statute made on referral from the district court. See Common Sense Alliance v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748 (Colo. 2000).
41. COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII. The provision was adopted as Amendment 27
by
voters
on
November
5,
2002.
Colo.
Gen.
Assembly,
http://www.leg.state.co.us/les/ballothistory.nsf (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
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flation. 42 Individual donors can pool their resources in "small
donor committees," groups that accept donations only from
natural persons who give no more than $50 each per calendar
year. 43 Most corporations and unions cannot directly support
44
candidates but can establish small donor committees to do so.
The article restores voluntary spending limits, regulates political advertisements, and imposes new disclosure requirements. 45

The 2003 General Assembly adopted statutes to carry out
article XXVIII. 46 One provision specifies that a corporation or
union can contribute directly to a political committee for disbursement to a candidate committee or political party, a point
47
on which article XXVIII is unclear.
2.

Consent of Union Members

An important campaign finance dispute arose in August of
2006, when Secretary of State Gigi Dennis adopted a regulation that required unions and other member organizations to
get their members' advance written consent before transferring
any part of members' dues to a small donor or political committee. 48 The regulation did this by restricting a "member" of a
union's small donor committee to a person who "at least annually gives the membership organization specific written permission to transfer dues to a political committee or small donor
committee." 4 9 Two unions, their small donor committees, and
others sued to overturn the regulation, arguing that it exceeded
the Secretary's authority under article XXVIII and violated the
First Amendment. The district court found both claims likely
to succeed and preliminarily enjoined the regulation's enforcement, and the court of appeals affirmed. 50 Therefore the regu42. COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3(1), (13).
43. Id. §§ 2(14), 3(2)-(4)(a).
44. Id. § 2(14)(c)(II).
45. Id. §§ 4-7. In Harwood v.Senate Majority Fund, LLC, 141 P.3d 962 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2006), the court rejected an attempt to treat an opinion poll as a regulated political advertisement.
46. 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws 2156-61 (codified in scattered sections of COLO.
REV. STAT. tit. 1, art. 45 (2007)).
47. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103.7 (2007).
48. Colo. Sec. of State, Rules Concerning Campaign & Political Finance, Rule
1.14, 8 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1505-6, (2007).
49. Id. at Rule 1.14(b).
50. Sanger v. Dennis, 148 P.3d 404 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
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lation was not in force for the 2006 election. No further action
in the lawsuit has been reported, but new Secretary of State
Mike Coffman reissued the contested regulation in February
2007. 5 1 The legislature then repealed the rule but did not forbid its reissue. 52 The legal jousting has an obvious political
dimension. Republican secretaries of state try to restrict union
support, which favors Democrats, and the Democratic legislature tries to maintain it.
If the rule is reissued and goes back to court, the state law
challenge appears fairly strong. Article XXVIII does not define
a member of a small donor committee, but the natural meaning
of its relevant sections is a member of the union; the secretary's
restrictive definition strains the text. 53 The First Amendment
54
issue is more uncertain.
3.

Nonprofit Advocacy Corporations

Soon after article XXVIII became effective, the Colorado
Right to Life Committee (CRLC) sued in federal court, making
First Amendment and due process attacks on several of the article's provisions as applied to CRLC's activities. 55 Article
XXVIII forbids corporations and labor unions to contribute directly to candidates, to make expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates, or to fund political advertising. 5 6 The article accommodated CRLC and similar
nonprofit advocacy corporations by exempting from these prohibitions corporations "formed for the purpose of promoting po-

51. See Colo. Sec. of State, Rule 1.14, supra note 48.
52. Colo. H.B. 07-1167 § l(q)(II), 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 749 (renewing regulations with explicit exceptions including Coffman's).
53. See COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(5)(b), (14)(a).
54. The Court of Appeals opinion cited a decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington that was thereafter unanimously reversed by the U. S. Supreme
Court. 148 P.3d at 414-15 (citing State ex rel. Wash. State Public Disclosure
Comm'n v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 130 P.3d 352 (Wash. 2006), rev'd sub nom., Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007)). However, the Washington case
involved so-called agency dues paid by non-members, and the Court said, "Respondent might have had a point if ... the statute burdened its ability to spend
the dues of its own members." 127 S. Ct. at 2380 n. 2. Therefore, the outcome of
the First Amendment issue in the Colorado case would be uncertain.
55. Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Davidson, 395 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (D.

Colo. 2005).
56.

COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3(4)(a).

2007] COLORADO CONSTITUTION IN THE NEW CENTURY 1273
litical ideas. ' 57 However, the exemption applies only if an advocacy corporation "does not accept contributions from business
corporations or labor organizations," 58 and CRLC was receiving
small contributions from corporations. In CRLC's lawsuit, the
court held that the ban could not constitutionally be applied to
CRLC and like entities that receive de minimis corporate contributions. 59 In other words, the court required that the accommodation for nonprofit advocacy corporations be broadened
to allow them to receive de minimis corporate contributions.
CRLC also challenged the amendment's requirement for
reporting and disclosure by anyone who spends more than
$1,000 per year on political advertising, 60 but this provision
was sustained by the court. 61 Finally, CRLC challenged its
treatment as a "political committee" subject to additional disclosure requirements because CRLC does not have the major
purpose of electing or nominating candidates. 62 Based on governing federal law, the court agreed and held that the amendment's regulation of political committees could not be imposed
63
on organizations like CRLC.
E. Article XXIX-Ethics in Government
1.

Description and Free Speech Issues

In 2006, Colorado voters added article XXIX, which outlaws most gifts (other than campaign contributions) to state
and local officers, employees, their contractors, and their families. 64 Forbidden gifts are sweepingly defined as any "thing of
value" unless received in exchange for something "of equal or

57. Id. § 3(4)(b). This exemption expressly applies to the limits on corporations and unions in art. XXVIII § 3 but not to the limits in § 6(2). The attorney
general in defending the case offered a narrowing interpretation that applies the
exemption to the latter section by implication, and the court accepted it. Colo.
Right to Life, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
58. COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3(4)(b)(III).
59. Colo. Right to Life, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 1014-15.
60. COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 6(1).
61. Colo. Right to Life, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.
62. Id. at 1019. The attorney general offered a narrowing interpretation to
avoid this ruling, but the court held that the amendment's wording precluded it.
Id. at 1021.
63. Id.

64. COLO. CONST. art. XXIX (also known by its ballot designation as Amendment 41).
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greater value. ' 65 The measure imposes monetary penalties of
twice the value of prohibited gifts. 66 It provides for a fivemember ethics commission to administer and enforce the prohibition. 6 7 The commission has broad enforcement authority
68
including subpoena power independent of the courts.
Before and after enactment, the amendment generated
controversy because of its breadth of coverage. It forbids a professional lobbyist to give any "gift or thing of value, of any kind
or nature" except for campaign contributions to persons on a
specified public sector list. 69 The list includes all state employees, independent contractors, and elected officials, and members of their immediate families. 7 0 It also includes employees,
independent contractors, and officials of counties and municipalities, but home-rule entities can remove themselves from
coverage by adopting laws "that address the matters covered by
this article. ' 7 1 Oddly, the ban omits officials, employees, or
contractors of local special districts, such as school districts, the

65.

Id. § 3(1)-(2).

Exceptions in § 3(3) are discussed infra, text at notes 76-

81.
66. Id. § 6. This section also states that "additional penalties may be provided
by law."
67. Id. § 5. The section provides that one commission member shall be appointed by each house of the General Assembly, by the governor, and by the chief
justice. The fifth member shall be an officer or employee of a local government
chosen by the other four. No more than two members may belong to the same political party, so at least one member must belong to a minor party or to no party.
Persons appointed must have had relevant party affiliations for at least two years
prior to appointment.
68. Id. § 5(4) (power to subpoena documents and witnesses). This appears to
encompass power to subpoena any communication between a public official and
any other person. The amendment has no provision for judicial review of commission activities, though the courts will very likely imply the power to review commission rulemaking, advisory opinions, and adjudications. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 24-4-102(3), 24-4-106 (2007). There has been some public controversy about
the possibility that each member of the commission is to have subpoena power, an
issue not settled by the text. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
69. COLO. CONST. art. XXIX, § 3(4). See id. § 2(5) (defining "professional lobbyist").
70. See id. § 2(1) (defining "government employee" as "including independent
contractors"). The prohibition has an exception for members of a lobbyist's immediate family. Id. § 3(4). It appears to include part-time employees.
71. Id. §§ 2(2)-(3), 7. Home-rule municipalities and counties are likely to invoke § 7 to remove themselves from coverage. Whether they must meet any minimum standard of rigor is unclear from the text of art. XXIX. If they succeed, art.
XXIX will govern only statutory cities and towns, but it will apply to most counties because only two have home rule. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at
305.
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Regional Transportation District, and the like. 72 It expressly
excludes members "of the judiciary," though the scope of this
exclusion is unclear. 73 The provision raises an important issue
about free expression. Information is often a "thing of value,"
and the ban on lobbyists' gifts makes no exception for it. To the
extent that the measure bars lobbyists' communications to offi74
cials, it is likely to be invalid under the First Amendment.
The most controversial part of the article forbids the same
list of public officials, employees, their contractors, and their
families from receiving anything of value from any person

72. Id. § 2(2) ("Local government' means county or municipality.").
73. Id. § 2(6). The exclusion of members "of the judiciary" can of course be
read to exempt all judges at every level. However, the subsection defines the covered category of "public officer" to include only statewide officers, so the exception
from it of members "of the judiciary" seems to exempt only statewide judges. The
section expressly excludes "any local government official," but they are separately
covered under § 2(3), applying to "an elected or appointed official of a local government." Whether county judges are local officials is uncertain. They are appointed by the governor and paid by the state, but they normally serve locally.
See COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 16, 18; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-30-103 (2007). Municipal judges do seem to be covered, though most of them are in home-rule municipalities that may remove themselves from Art. XXIX. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
A parallel issue is whether employees of judicial branches are covered.
The section defining covered employees is expressly limited to the executive and
legislative branches at the state level but includes "any employee" of "any local
government," which appears to include employees of local judicial branches unless
in an exempt home-rule entity. Id. § 2(1).
Another uncertainty is whether art. XXIX applies to district attorneys.
Davidson v. Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648 (Colo. 2004), held that judicial districts are
"political subdivisions" of the state for purposes of term limits on local government
officials. See infra notes 395-412 and accompanying text. On the other hand,
preexisting state ethics statutes define district attorneys as statewide officers.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-203(1)(c) (2007). If judicial districts are local governments for purposes of art. XXIX, they are not covered because the only covered
local governments are counties and municipalities. Id. § 2(2). If they are instead
part of state government for purposes of the article, district judges and employees
are expressly excluded, but district attorneys are covered as statewide officers.
Id. § 2(1), (6).
74. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text, discussing a pending lawsuit raising this and other First Amendment claims, Developmental Pathways,
Inc. v. Ritter, No. 2007CV1353, slip op. at 2 (Denver Dist. Ct. May 31, 2007), appeal pending.
As noted in the text below, one proposal to narrow the scope of art. XXIX
would require that violations be breaches of the public trust for private gain. See
infra text at notes 82-83. However, a lobbyist by definition works for private
gain. For lobbyists, the proposed narrowing would thus depend on the vague
phase "breach of the public trust." If public trust in lobbyists is illustrated by the
vote to adopt art. XXIX, this would be little protection for lobbyists' communications.
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unless that person receives "lawful consideration of equal or
greater value in return. ' 7 5 The ban has major exceptions for
campaign contributions and gifts by "a relative or personal
friend of the recipient on a special occasion" and several minor
exceptions, notably non-cash gifts worth no more than $50 per
year.76 It allows reimbursement of expenses to attend events
at which the recipient is to take an active part when the sponsor is a state or local government or nonprofit entity. 7 7 To the
extent that it forbids reimbursement for passively attending
such events to gain information pertinent to official duties, or
for attending events sponsored by the federal government, it
raises yet another First Amendment issue. 78 Forbidden gifts
are defined to include "promises or negotiations of future employment," 79 which appears to impose severe limits on the ability of many part-time legislators to make a living and to impair
many other covered persons' ability to change or augment their
employments.
The gift ban has an important exception for unsolicited "informational material";8 0 free expression is accommodated to
that extent. Given the importance of free expression, the
quoted phrase should and probably will be interpreted broadly
to cover all forms of communication. However, the exception is
expressly limited to unsolicited information. To the extent that
solicited information of value is prohibited, this provision is
81
also likely to be invalid under the First Amendment.
The apparently sweeping terms of section 3's gifts ban may
be limited by section 6, which authorizes penalties to be imposed only on a public officer or employee who "breaches the
75.

COLO. CONST. art. XXIX,

§ 3(1)-(2). "Person" is broadly defined to include

"any legal entity." Id. at § 2(4). Family members are expressly covered by § 3(2)
but are omitted from § 3(1). The scope of § 3(1) is largely included in the broader
terms of § 3(2) except that the latter has an annual exemption of gifts worth $50
or less.
76. Id. § 3.
An odd omission is reimbursement of expenses to attend
77. Id. § 3(3)(f.
events sponsored by the federal government or federal agencies, which appear to
be forbidden even if the covered person is an invited speaker. Nonprofit sponsors
do not qualify if they receive more than 5% of their funding from for-profit entities. Id.
78. See infra text at notes 97-100. Forbidding reimbursement of expenses to
be a speaker at a federal government event, see supra note 77, is a yet more direct
interference with freedom of communication.
79. COLO. CONST. art. XXIX, § 3(2).
80. Id. § 3(3)(d).
81. See infra text at notes 97-100.
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public trust for private gain" or on anyone "inducing such
breach. '8 2 One can read sections 3 and 6 two ways. The
stricter reading interprets section 3 to be a per se definition of
breaches of the public trust for private gain. Its extremely specific detail makes this reading fit the wording quite well. A
less strict reading would require proof in each case that an officer or employee not only took a gift forbidden by section 3 but
did so in a way that breached the public trust for private gain.
The key words are the vague phrase "breaches the public trust"
because any gift of a thing of value is by definition a private
gain. The latter reading is somewhat cumbersome but has the
virtue of restricting what is otherwise a remarkably broad gift
ban. However, it requires a system of case-by-case application,
which could prove burdensome. The legislature imposed a version of this reading on the ethics commission, 83 so it may be
tested in practice.
A third provision of the amendment that has generated
some controversy forbids any statewide elected officer or member of the General Assembly from personally representing "another person or entity for compensation before any other statewide elected officeholder or member of the general assembly,
for a period of two years" after leaving office. 84 This is another
provision that is literally extremely broad. Its apparent core
purpose is to forbid those leaving high office to become lobbyists for two years. But the section forbids any person leaving
office from appearing before the executive or legislative
branches in any way connected with his or her employment,
however briefly or incidentally. The provision authorizes statutes to impose further restrictions, implying that its terms are
to be read as minimum requirements.
2.

Implementing Statute

During and after article XXIX's enactment, controversies
arose over whether the ban forbids disaster relief or scholarships and academic prizes awarded to members of the targeted
classes or disaster relief to them. Sponsors of the measure ar82. COLO. CONST. art. XXIX, § 6. Presumably the definitions of officers and
employees in other sections apply to § 6, so they include independent contractors
and forbid certain gifts to family members. See id. § 2.
83. See infra text at note 88-89.
84. COLO. CONST. art. XXIX, § 4.
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gued that it was not intended to do so, and after enactment,
they drafted and supported a bill in the legislature to exclude
85
altogether these and many other categories from the gift ban.
The bill put considerable strain on the literal terms of article
XXIX. Section 1 insists on "specific standards to guide their
conduct,"8 6 and section 3 appears to be just that, specific standards. Moreover, forbidding academic awards appears to have
been a particular purpose of section 3's explicit prohibition of
"rewards" and "honoraria."8 7 And by legalizing all scholarships, academic prizes, disaster relief, and the other named
categories, the bill seemed to claim that receipt of those benefits could never amount to a "violation of the public trust" or result from "an effort to realize personal financial gain through
public office." Human experience makes that a doubtful proposition.
However, the Senate rejected the House bill. The two
houses eventually agreed on a bill that established the commis-

85. Colo. H.B. 07-1304, 66th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2007) (at proposed COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-18.5-102(8)(b)) (excluding student financial aid; academic awards; benefits to address the impacts of illness, injury, crime, act of God,
or accident; bequests, inheritances, and estate planning gifts; investment income;
insurance proceeds; court judgments or payments to settle a legal claim; and "any
other gift or thing of value that the [Ethics Commission] determines not to constitute a breach of the public trust").
The bill offered an alternative fix. It specified that a person does not receive a gift at all if, in return for a benefit, he or she gives anything "of value sufficient to sustain a contract." Id. (at proposed COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-18.5-102(5)).
This flatly contradicted the strict language of the amendment, which demands
that the public officer receiving a benefit give something "of equal or greater
value" in return. COLO. CONST. art. XXIX, § 3(2). Consideration to sustain a contract can be much less than that; a classic definition says that one peppercorn can
be sufficient. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 115 (rev. ed. 1936). If valid and taken seriously, this definition could have virtually canceled section 3(1)-(2)'s gift ban altogether. For scholarships, the bill included yet a third fix, claiming that any duty of diligence undertaken by a scholarship recipient is sufficient exchange to remove the
scholarship from the gift ban. H.B. 07-1304 § 1, 66th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 2007) (at proposed COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-18.5-102(5)). Corrupt instances
are conceivable.
The bill also sought to narrow article XXIX's provision that forbids any
statewide elected officer or member of the General Assembly from personally representing anyone before any state elected official for two years after leaving office.
The bill would have limited this provision to persons who become employed "in a
position primarily dedicated to lobbying." Id. (at proposed COLO. REV. STAT. § 2418.5-102(7)). This was a sensible provision but one again at war with the literal
terms of the amendment.
86. COLO. CONST. art. XXIX, § l(1)(e).
87. Id. § 3(2).
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sion and adopted a version of the section 6 interpretation explained above. 88 It requires that "the Commission shall dismiss as frivolous any complaint filed under article XXIX that
fails to allege that a public officer, member of the general assembly, local government official, or government employee has
accepted or received any gift or other thing of value for private
gain or personal financial gain." 89 The latter terms are defined
as any "thing of value given or offered by a person seeking to
influence an official act." The bill also requires the Commission to render advisory opinions when sought by covered persons and to do so within twenty days after a request is made. 90
This bill was submitted to the Colorado Supreme Court requesting an opinion on its validity, but the court declined to
hear it. 9 1 It is hard to know what to make of the quoted provision defining frivolous claims. A gift of a thing of value is by
definition a financial gain to the donee, so a complaint can allege this freely. If the complaint must also allege that the donor sought to "influence an official act" and must specify that
act, complainants are somewhat constrained, though not severely. 92 Moreover, that reading would essentially define bribery of a lawmaker, which has been criminal from the state's
founding, making article XXIX redundant except that its penalty appears to be civil with a lower standard of proof. 9 3 The
statute also restricts the commission's subpoena power by requiring concurrence of at least four members to issue a sub94
poena.
Despite the many inconsistencies between various narrowing proposals and the amendment's terms, if the ethics com88. See supra text at note 82-83.
89. 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 650 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-18.5101(5)(a) (2007)).
90. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-18.5-101(4)(b) (2007).
91. See H.J.R. 07-1019, 66th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2007); Lynn
Bartels & April M. Washington, Amendment 41 Bill Signed, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS,
Apr.
27,
2007,
available
at
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/government/article/0,2777,DRMN_239
06_5507527,00.html.
92. See Peter Blake, Op-Ed, Ethics Commission Put in a Bind, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 28, 2007, at A32 (interpreting the law to require that complaints allege an improper motive for a gift). However, the statutory text specifies
only an allegation of personal financial gain.
93. See COLO. CONST. art. XII, §§ 6-7; COLO. REV. STAT. tit. 18, art. 8 & tit.
24, art 18 (2007). These are current laws. For original bans, see COLO. CONST.
art. V, §§ 41-42 (1876); GEN'L LAWS COLO. §§ 684-85 (1877).
94. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-18.5-101(8) (2007).
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mission were to adopt such measures, the fix might work. The
Colorado Supreme Court has on a number of occasions rescued
Colorado from the literal words of initiative measures when the
words would have produced burdensome results that voters
probably did not intend. For example, Mesa County tried to
use the literal wording of TABOR to end tax support for its
courthouse, but the court used imaginative reasoning to reject
96
the effort. 9 5 Other TABOR interpretations were similar.
However, the conflict of wording in the present instance would
surpass any previous case.
3.

First Amendment Lawsuit

In March 2007, a diverse group of plaintiffs sued the state
to enjoin enforcement of article XXIX's gift bans as violations of
First Amendment rights of free speech, association, and petition. 9 7 They sought and obtained a preliminary injunction
against application of sections 2 and 3 of the article. 98 The
court held that the amendment "chills the ability of lobbyists
and legislators to communicate with one another, as well as the
right of organizations to hire lobbyists to convey their views to
legislators and government employees" in violation of the First
Amendment.9 9 The state sought and obtained direct review in
the Colorado Supreme Court, which heard argument in Octo00
ber.1

95. State ex rel. Norton v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Mesa County, 897 P.2d
788 (Colo. 1995).
96. See In re Submission of Interrogatories on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d
549, 557 (Colo. 1999) (rejecting literal interpretation of TABOR term because it
"could lead to absurd results" and "cripple the everyday workings of government");
Bolt v. Arapahoe County Sch. Dist. No. 6, 898 P.2d 525, 537 (Colo. 1995) (rejecting
rigid interpretation of TABOR "which would have the effect of working a reduction in government services").
97. See Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, No. 07CV1353, slip op. at 2 (Denver Dist. Ct. May 31, 2007), appealpending.
98. Id., slip op. at 41. The suit did not challenge the provisions banning legislators from lobbying for two years after leaving office or the provisions establishing an ethics commission. Id., slip op. at 2.
99. Id., slip op. at 33.
100. Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, No. 07SA181 (Colo. 2007).
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F.

ConstitutionalClutter

Articles XXVIII and XXIX are two more detailed provisions
in the Colorado Constitution-more than nine and five pages
respectively in the Revised Statutes-that would work better
as statutes that could be readily adjusted based on experience.
Placing the measures in the constitution also eliminated any
role for the Colorado Bill of Rights provision on free speech,
making free speech disputes depend solely on the federal Constitution. The tobacco tax measure embedded yet another
spending directive in the Colorado Constitution.
Disputes over article XXIX induced the legislature to consider amending article V to make constitutional initiatives
more difficult than legislative measures, thus providing an incentive for petitioners to elect the latter form. 101 The measure
also provided that the General Assembly's power to amend or
repeal successful legislative initiatives requires a two-thirds
vote of both houses for five years after passage, an additional
incentive to choose the legislative form. 102 The proposal did
not get the necessary two-thirds vote for the 2008 ballot, but
proposals like it will probably be considered in the 2008 session.
II.

INTERPRETATIONS AND DECISIONS

1 03

A. Article II-The ColoradoBill of Rights
1.

Search and Seizure, Juries, and Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt

Rights issues are routinely raised in criminal cases and
just as routinely addressed under federal law, mostly with no
distinctive discussion of the Colorado Constitution.10 4 However, a few post-2000 decisions merit discussion.
The Colorado Supreme Court continued to interpret the
Colorado Constitution's protection against search and seizure
to give accused persons more protection than its federal coun101.
102.

See H.C.R. 07-1001, 66th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2007).
Id.

103. These are organized in numerical order of the constitutional provisions
addressed.
104. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 31-32.
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terpart. 10 5 Drugs found by a dog during a traffic stop were
suppressed because the court held the dog's sniff to be a search
under the Colorado Constitution, contrary to federal precedents. 106 To justify a dog's sniff of a stopped car, officers need
not meet the full standard of probable cause but must have
07
reasonable suspicion of crime, which was lacking. 1
The court also overturned a search warrant issued to gain
access to the book-buying records of a criminal suspect at Denver's celebrated Tattered Cover Book Store.10 8 The court based
the decision on constitutional rights to freedom of speech and
freedom from unwarranted searches, and it discussed the
rights provisions of both federal and state constitutions. 109 The
court stated that the state rights were broader than federal, although it did not cite any conflicting federal decision-indeed,
the federal decision most nearly on point, involving the book
purchases of Monica Lewinsky, was consistent with the court's
ruling. 110 In any case, the court rested the decision on the
state provisions and adopted a balancing test and procedural
rule to govern attempts to search for expressive materials that
have free speech protections. Under the test, which was not
met in the Tattered Cover case, the government must demonstrate a compelling need for specific information, and the thirdparty bookstore must be afforded a hearing prior to execution
of the warrant.1 1 1
Another important bill of rights decision involved the size
of Colorado juries. By statute, accused persons in Colorado are
entitled to trial by jury of twelve for felonies, six for misdemeanors. 1 1 2 The Colorado Constitution requires trial by jury
for all "criminal cases" and provides that in "courts not of record," a criminal jury "may consist of less than twelve persons." 1 13 The text implies that juries in courts "of record" must
have twelve members. A man charged with misdemeanors in a

105. For prior decisions, see id. at 37-38.
106. People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 671-74 (Colo. 2001).
107. Id. at 673-74. Three justices disagreed with both rulings. Id. at 677-81
(Kourlis, J., joined by Rice, J. & Coats, J., dissenting).
108. Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002).
109. Id. at 1051-56.
110. Id. at 1056 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords Inc., 26 Med. L. Rptr. 1599 (D.D.C. 1998)).
111. Id. at 1058-61.
112.
113.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-406(1) (2007). See also COLO. R. CRIM. P. 23.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 23.
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county court demanded a jury of twelve, arguing that county
courts are courts of record, but the supreme court rejected his
claim. 114 Based on an extensive analysis, the court decided
that the Colorado Constitution requires a jury of twelve for
felonies, but interpreted the "courts not of record" phrase to
equate historically with misdemeanor offenses, so that the
General Assembly can provide for juries of six in misdemeanor
cases, as it has provided. 1 15 The decision raises a question for
trials in which excusing jurors reduces a jury to fewer than
twelve. 116
In 2004, the Colorado Supreme Court considered the proof
necessary for conviction of crime. 1 17 Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt has always been required by Colorado constitutional
law. 118 The 2004 case turned on the principle's application to
sufficiency of evidence to support a general verdict when more
than one theory is presented to a jury. The defendant argued
that in his case, proof of one theory was insufficient, causing
the general verdict of guilty to deny him due process of law.
The U. S. Supreme Court had rejected this interpretation of the
federal due process requirement,1 1 9 so the case depended on interpretation of the Colorado Constitution. 12 0 The Colorado Supreme Court sustained the conviction, conforming its interpre-

114. People v. Rodriguez, 112 P.3d 693 (Colo. 2005). The court pointed out that
county courts are courts of record under the current judicial article adopted in
1962, but it distinguished modern usage from that of section 23. Id. at 705-09.
115. Id. at 696-709. The court rejected contrary dicta in prior decisions. Id. at
697.
116. See id. at 712 (Coats, J., concurring in the judgment). By statute and
court rule, alternate jurors can replace those excused, and if alternates are unavailable, the trial can proceed with fewer than twelve by consent of the parties.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-406(2) (2007) (except for class 1 felonies); COLO. R. CRIM
P. 23 (7) (in all cases). The latter provisions should be valid because the right to
jury trial can be waived altogether. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-406(2) (2007)
(except for class 1 felonies); COLO. R. CRIM P. 23(5) (in all cases but only with
"consent of the people"); Garcia v. People, 615 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1980) (statute controls; consent of prosecutor not required). However, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1406(7) (2007) allows a court to accept a verdict from eleven regardless of the parties' consent when a juror is excused for cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict. This provision is in doubt under the decision in Rodriguez.
117. People v. Dunaway, 88 P.3d 619 (Colo. 2004).
118. People ex rel. Juhan v. Dist. Ct., 439 P.2d 741, 744 (1968).
119. Griffin v. U.S., 502 U.S. 46 (1991).
120. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25 (due process clause).
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tation of the state requirement to the federal and overruling a
prior, contrary decision. 121
2.

Gun Rights

Gun regulation under article II section 13 was once again
at issue when a Denver lawyer sued the city and county, claiming constitutional rights to carry an unconcealed firearm on his
person and to carry a concealed firearm in a motor vehicle, contrary to Denver ordinances. A divided court of appeals rejected
his claim, and the Colorado Supreme Court declined review. 122
2003 state statutes sought to overturn most of the Denver laws
at issue. 12 3 Denver successfully challenged these on home-rule
grounds. 124
3.

Eminent Domain and Retroactivity

Since 2000, the Colorado Supreme Court has decided two
notable cases about the constitutional power of eminent domain. The first arose when Public Service Company of Colorado raised the capacity of a Douglas County power line from

121. Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 628-31 (overruling James v. People, 727 P.2d 850
(Colo. 1986)). James's conviction was upheld because the court found the evidence
sufficient to support all theories presented to the jury.
Nevertheless, the
Dunaway court treated the James ruling on proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a
holding. The court also pointedly opined, 'Where the analogous federal and state
constitutional provisions are textually identical, we have always viewed cases interpreting the federal constitutional provision as persuasive authority."
Dunaway, 88 P.3d at 630. Dissenting justices disagreed and advocated adherence
to James. Id. at 636 (Bender, J., dissenting). Dunaway was a clear holding because a majority of the court found the evidence insufficient on the alternative
theory presented to the jury. Id. at 624-28, 636.
122. Trinen v. City & County of Denver, 53 P.3d 754 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002), cert.
denied, No. 02SC131, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 708 (Colo. Sept. 9, 2002). The majority
relied mainly on the supreme court's 1994 decision that sustained other parts of
the Denver ordinance. Robertson v. City & County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325 (Colo.
1994). See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 47.
A recent federal court decision overturned the District of Columbia's handgun ban
based on the Second Amendment. Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C.
Cir. 2007), stay granted by Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
12467 (D.C. Cir. May 24, 2007). Therefore, Denver's regulations could be the subject of federal law claims.
123. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-10-523 (2007) (referencing COLO. REV. STAT.
tit. 18, art. 12, part 2 & tit. 29, art. 11.7).
124. See infra text at notes 450-52. No home-rule issues were raised in the
Trinen case. See 53 P.3d at 759.
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115 to 230 kilovolts, and neighboring landowners sued the
company in inverse condemnation and tort. The court rejected
their inverse condemnation claim, holding that, as a matter of
law, alleged invasions by noise and electromagnetic radiation
do not constitute takings in violation of article II section 15.125
The second decision rejected a claim to compensation when the
T-REX highway project put up a concrete retaining wall that
obstructed the view of Happy Church from Interstate 25.126
The court held that owners have no property right to be seen by
motorists on a public highway. The court distinguished a prior
decision holding that owners must be compensated for reduction of their properties' natural beauty by construction of a
power line across it. 127 In other words, there is a constitutionally protected property right in the natural appearance of one's
land but not in its visibility from a public highway. Two other
recent constitutional cases were routine applications of federal
12 8
precedents.
However, the court and the General Assembly addressed
important issues about the statutory scope of the eminent domain power. The Department of Transportation (DOT) condemned land near Aspen for a highway project that included a
parking and transit facility. 129 The landowner argued that
DOT's statutory authority to condemn for highway purposes
did not authorize takings for parking and transit uses. 130 The
supreme court's opinions, ruling for DOT, included an extensive discussion of the relationship between eminent domain
statutes and constitutional standards. 131
125. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377 (Colo. 2001). The court
rejected the company's claim that article XXV, governing the Public Utilities
Commission, insulated it from plaintiffs' claims. Id. at 384-85. It also rejected
plaintiffs' tort claim for trespass, although by a 4-3 vote, it sustained their tort
claim based on nuisance. Id. at 389-97.
126. Dep't of Transp. of Colo. v. Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d 111 (Colo.
2007).

127.

Id. at 113-15 (distinguishing La Plata Elec. Ass'n v. Cummins, 728 P.2d

696 (Colo. 1986)). The court said its decision accords with the majority rule
among states on denying compensation for lost visibility. Id. at 114.
128. See Animas Valley Sand & Gravel v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 38 P.3d 59
(Colo. 2001) (following federal precedents on regulatory takings); Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 17 P.3d 797, 802 (Colo. 2001) (following federal precedents on temporary takings).
129. Dep't of Transp. v. Stapleton, 97 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2004).
130. Id. at 939.
131. Id. at 941-45, 945-46 (Coats, J., concurring in the judgment), 946-51
(Kourlis, J., dissenting).
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The General Assembly tackled the issue of condemnation
for urban redevelopment, an issue that received extensive coverage in the national press after the U. S. Supreme Court's
2005 decision in a Connecticut case. 132 The constitutional issue is whether redevelopment conducted by private investors is
33
a "public use," which state and federal constitutions require. 1
Colorado law has allowed this power, 134 but statutory amendments adopted in 2004 narrowed its availability. For condemnation to aid private redevelopment, Colorado law now requires
a finding of blight, gives affected owners a right of first refusal
if the property is no longer needed for the project, and gives affected owners a right to bid on redevelopment projects. 135 Several 2006 session bills and proposed constitutional amendments would have further limited, or forbidden, eminent
domain for redevelopment, but none passed. 136 An enacted
measure restricts its use for private toll roads. 137
Another 2004 amendment restricted the power of municipalities to condemn land outside their boundaries by limiting
the power to utilities purposes. 138 This was dubbed the Telluride Amendment, intended to stop the town of Telluride's condemnation of a large tract of land just outside town boundaries
for open space and recreational purposes. 139 The statute generated constitutional issues about home-rule powers discussed

132. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
133. U. S. CONST. amend. V; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15.
134. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 48.
135. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-105.5 (2007).
136. See H.C.R. 06-1001, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006); S.B. 06078, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006); S.B. 06-154, 65th Gen. Assem.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006); S.B. 06-169 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo.
2006); H.B. 06-1096, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006); H.B. 06-1099,
65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006); H.B. 06-1208, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006). For proposed initiatives, see Colorado Ballot Proposal Information, http://www.state.co.us/gov-dirleg-dir/lcsstaff/balpage.htm (last visited
Nov. 29, 2007) (click on "2005-2006 Initiatives Filed," then go to submitted initiatives nos. 53, 56, and 64).
137. See S.B. 06-078, (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-45-104 (2007)). More
stringent measures have been proposed. See, e.g., H.B. 07-1068, 66th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2007), and Initiative 37 at the website cited supra note
136.
138. 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 1742 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-101(4)
(2007)).
139. See Bruce V. Bigelow, Setback for S.D. Industrialist, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIBUNE,
May
10,
2007,
available
at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20070510/newslb lOblue.html.
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below. 140 It might also have been challenged under Colorado's
ban on a law "retrospective in its operation,"1 4 1 though Telluride did not do that. There is no doubt that the legislature intended the statute to forbid Telluride's pending condemnation.
Therefore, the governing tests would be to determine whether
the statute impaired vested rights or imposed new obligations
on past transactions, and whether the law was remedial or procedural in character. 142 The law was plainly substantive, but it
would be difficult to characterize it as impairing vested rights
or altering past transactions.
A statute enacted in 2007 purports to forbid federal condemnation of land for use by the Army. 143 About two years ago
Fort Carson announced its intention to expand the 235,000144
acre Pifion Canyon Maneuver Site southwest of La Junta.
The proposed Pifion expansion area, which could include
418,000 acres in at least four counties, is home to dinosaur
tracks and archaeological treasures, including wagon imprints
from the Santa Fe Trail, as well as many farms and ranches. 145
Does the legislature have authority to limit the U.S. Army's
power of eminent domain? The form of the statute withdraws
existing state consent under the federal Arsenals and Dockyards Clause. 146 That clause allows the federal government to
''exercise exclusive Legislation" over land in federal ownership;
it says nothing about how federal ownership is acquired or
about eminent domain. Therefore, it is unlikely that the state
action will defeat federal efforts to condemn the land legally,
47
though of course it may have important political effects. 1

140. See infra text at notes 456-58.
141. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11.
142. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 44-45.
143. H.B. 07-1069, 2006 Gen. Assem., 65th Sess. (Colo. 2006) (codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. § 3-1-102 (2007)).
144. See Dick Foster, In Rural Colorado, A Way of Life in Peril, RocKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 18, 2007, at A21-23.
145. See id; Santa Fe Trail Scenic & Historic Byway, Mountain Branch,
http://www.santafetrailscenicandhistoricbyway.org (last visited May 23, 2007).
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
147. Federal jurisdiction usually depends on questions of federal enumerated
powers and on the doctrine of preemption rather than on the Arsenals and Dockyards Clause. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 3.4, 9.1 (7th ed. 2004).
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Equal Protection, Civil Juries, and Tort Law

In 1988 the General Assembly passed the Health Care
Availability Act (HCAA), which caps tort damages in medical
malpractice actions. 148 In 1993, the Colorado Supreme Court
sustained the caps against claims that they denied equal protection, due process, and jury trial rights. 149 On the jury trial
claim, the court followed several prior decisions holding that
the Colorado Constitution does not guarantee juries in civil
cases and overruled an isolated decision to the contrary.15 0 In
a 2002 decision, the court rejected an equal protection attack
on a section of the HCAA that applies different damages rules
to an "incapacitated person represented by a conservator" and
a "non-incapacitated person." 15 1 A 2004 decision rejected renewed equal protection and jury trial attacks on the HCAA. 152
In each equal protection decision, the court held that the rational basis test of state and federal law applies, and the statute had a rational basis for its distinctions. 153
B.

Article III-Separationof Powers

For some years, the General Assembly and the governor
have sparred over control of federal funds allocated to the
state. The Colorado Supreme Court held that custodial or trust
funds for specified purposes are constitutionally subject to executive control and beyond the legislature's power of appropriation. 154 A 2004 bill sought to limit the definition of custodial
funds to those granted "for a particular purpose" and to claim
148.

Health Care Availability Act, 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws 612-25 (codified as

amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-101 et seq. (2007)). The damages caps are
at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-64-302, 302.5 (2007).
149. Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d. 901 (Colo. 1993).
See
OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 58, 62.
150. Scholz, 851 P.2d at 905-07, overruling City of Denver v. Hyatt, 63 P. 403
(Colo. 1900).
151. HealthONE v. Rodriguez, 50 P.3d 879, 892-96 (Colo. 2002). For damages
exceeding $150,000, the statute allows competent adults to receive lump-sum
damages but requires incapacitated persons to accept damages paid in periodic
installments. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-64-201 to 210 (2007).
152. Garhart v. ColumbialHealthONE, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 580-81 (jury trial),
583-84 (equal protection) (Colo. 2004). The court also rejected claims that the
statute violated separation of powers requirements. Id at 581-83.
153. Garhart,95 P.3d at 584; Rodriguez, 50 P.3d at 893-94; Scholz, 851 P.2d at
906-07.
154. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1 at 93, 137-38, 435.

2007] COLORADO CONSTITUTION IN THE NEW CENTURY 1289
legislative control over funds granted "for the support of general or essential state government services." 155 While the bill
was pending, the General Assembly submitted two interrogatories to the supreme court seeking to determine the bill's constitutional validity. The first sought an opinion on the bill's definition of custodial money in general; the second sought an
opinion on the definition as applied to a particular federal
grant program. 156 The court approved the latter but refused to
answer the former, stating that each application must be
evaluated on particular facts. 157 As the dissent pointed out,
this gives the courts detailed supervisory power over federal
and other outside funds received by the state. 158 However, the
court's decision went far toward approving the statute's general
definition. 159
Challenges to plaintiffs' standing are a staple of litigation,
and most generate nothing notable. One exception was the
Colorado Supreme Court's detailed review of Colorado standing
law in a 2004 decision, Ainscough v. Owens. 16 0 The court held
that union members had standing to challenge Governor
Owens's 2001 executive order ending automatic payroll deductions of union dues for state employees. 161 Standing was also
at issue in a major tax and public debt case discussed under
62
that heading. 1
In 2003, the supreme court reviewed Colorado's version of
the political question doctrine. 163 The decision held that review of local bond elections is not a nonjusticiable political
question, but the opinion recognized that the doctrine is part of
Colorado constitutional law. 164

155. H.B. 04-1098, 64th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2004) (codified at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-75-201 (2007)).
156. In re Interrogatories Submitted by the Gen. Assembly on House Bill 041098, 88 P.3d 1196, 1196-99 (Colo. 2004).
157. Id. at 1203, 1205.
158. Id. at 1205-07 (Coats, J., dissenting).
159. The bill as amended was enacted as COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-75-201 (2007).
160. 90 P.3d 851 (Colo. 2004).
161. Id. No decision had been made after remand when Governor Ritter overruled Governor Owens's executive order and restored payroll deductions of union
dues. See Colo. Exec. Order D00607 (2007), overrulingColo. Exec. Order D 007 01
(2001). The relevant statute is COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50-104(8) (2007).
162. See infra, text at notes 375-85.
163. Busse v. City of Golden, 73 P.3d 660 (Colo. 2003).
164. See id. at 664-65. See infra text accompanying notes 360, 386-92, discussing other issues in Busse.
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165
C. Article V-The Initiative

1.

Single Subject Rule

In 1994 voters limited citizens' initiatives to a single subject, 166 and the General Assembly established original jurisdiction in the Colorado Supreme Court to review the issue before a
measure appears on the ballot. 167 Since then, the court has issued numerous opinions applying the standard. One notable
example involved the measure seeking to forbid bilingual education in Colorado. A 2002 decision of the court approved the
proposal for the ballot that year. 168 Voters then defeated it. 169
However, in 2006 the court held that a proposed initiative to
forbid most public services to illegal alien residents of the state
violated the single subject rule because it included two distinct
kinds of services, those "that benefit members of the targeted
group" and "other administrative services that are unrelated to
the delivery of individual welfare benefits." 170 This was an
overly technical application of the requirement; the dissenting
opinion was more persuasive. 17 1 In reaction to it, the governor
called the legislature into special session, where it adopted several statutes to restrict such services and proposed two related
statutory referendums, both of which were approved by voters. 172
165. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02, discussing a proposal to amend this provision.
166. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5.5). The 1994 measure also limited referred
measures to a single subject. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 116, 117,
119.
167. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-106.6, 1-40-107 (2007).
168. In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for Proposed Initiatives
2001-2002 # 21 and # 22 ("English Language Educ."), 44 P.3d 213 (Colo. 2002).
An earlier proposal on the same subject failed because its title was found to be
misleading. In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary for 19992000 # 258(A) (English Language Educ. in Pub. Schools), 4 P.3d 1094 (Colo. 2000).
169. See
Colorado
Legislative
Council,
Ballot
Issue
History,
http://www.leg.state.co.us/lcsballothistory.nsf/ (follow "2002" hyperlink; then follow "English Language Education" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 3, 2007). See also
infra text at notes 219-39, discussing local control of Colorado schools.
170. In re Title & Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2005-2006 # 55, 138
P.3d 273, 280 (Colo. 2006).
171.
Id. at 283-85.
172. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-13-704.5, 8-2-122, 24-19.7-101-02, 24-34-107,
24-37.5-107, 24-46-105.3, 24-76.5-101 to 103, 30-15-401, 31-25-50, 39-22-604
(2007); H.B. 06S-1020 (Colo. 2006) (Referendum H: Unauthorized Alien Labor
Tax) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-22-104, -304, -529 (2007)); H.B. 06S-1022
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2.

Local Government Cases

The initiative was at issue in three decisions seeking to extend the right to county voters. Article V, section 1 of the Colorado Constitution guarantees the initiative to voters of "every
city, town, and municipality."' 173 This provision has been assumed not to include counties. Statutes provide for county initiatives for specific purposes, 174 but no general right has been
established. When home rule was made available to counties
in 1970, the statute passed to carry it out required that county
home-rule charters provide for initiative and referendum powers. 17 5 Recently, citizens of statutory counties challenged lack
of the right in three lawsuits. Litigants in two state cases argued that the article V provision should be interpreted to include all counties, but both the supreme court and court of appeals disagreed. 17 6 A federal case argued that granting the
power to residents of home-rule counties but not statutory
counties violated the federal equal protection clause, but the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the claim. 177
Another decision depended on the rule that the initiative
power is limited to legislative matters. Petitions were filed to
place several matters on the Colorado Springs ballot. The city
council adopted one of the measures proposed and sued for a
declaratory judgment that the remaining measures were administrative rather than legislative and thus not proper sub-

(Colo. 2006) (Referendum K: Attorney General Initiate Immigration Lawsuit)
(codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-19.9-101 (2007)).
173. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(9).
174. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-2-104 (2007) (sales tax).
175. COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-11-508 (2007), applying COLO. CONST. art. XIV, §
16. So far, Colorado has but two home-rule counties, Pitkin and Weld. See Colorado Counties, Inc., http://www.ccionline.org/counties.htm (last visited Aug. 10,

2005).
176. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. County Road Users Ass'n, 11 P.3d 432 (Colo.
2000); Dellinger v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 20 P.3d 1234 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
The former decision was based mostly on statutory interpretation; its statement
on the Colorado Constitution was something of an aside. See id. at 436. The latter decision was squarely based on the constitutional issue.
A proposed initiative that appeared on the 2006 ballot would have required the
initiative right for statutory counties and all special districts, but voters rejected
Statement,
Impact
Fiscal
38,
Amendment
See
it.
http://www.state.co.us/gov-dirfleg-dir/lcsstaff/bluebook 06Amendment38fiscalnote
.pdf.
177. Save Pallisade Fruitland v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2002).
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jects of the initiative power. 1 78 The court of appeals agreed in
part. It severed the administrative and legislative measures
179
and ordered the latter placed on the 2006 ballot.
D. Article V-GAVEL Amendment
The 1988 amendment to article V known as Give a Vote to
Every Legislator (GAVEL) requires legislative committees to
consider every bill "upon its merits." 180 A house rule allowed a
member to move, out of docket order, that a committee favorably report a measure to the entire House of Representatives.
Dubbed a "supermotion," this device was allegedly used three
times in the 2002 session to kill measures proposed by minority
members. 18 1 In 2002, a minority member sued house majority
leaders, claiming that use of a "supermotion" was an invalid
method to kill bills without considering their merits. 182 The
court of appeals agreed that use of a "supermotion" without any
discussion or testimony was invalid under GAVEL, but the
court sustained validity of the House rule if discussion and tes183
timony were allowed.
E. Article V-Redistricting CongressionalSeats
In 1974, Colorado voters removed the power to draw state
legislative districts from the General Assembly, establishing
the bipartisan Reapportionment Commission. 18 4 The legislature retains authority to draw districts for members of Congress 18 5 but, it turns out, only if the power is exercised

178.
179.

City of Colorado Springs v. Bull, 143 P.3d 1127 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 1132-39. The two measures that were placed on the ballot failed to

pass. See El Paso County Clerk and Recorder, 2006 Coordinated Election Results
(2006), http://www.elpasoelections.com/2006-general/results-text.html (last visited
Aug. 28, 2007).
180. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 20. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1 at
127-28.
181. See Grossman v. Dean, 80 P.3d 952, 957 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
182. Id. at 956.
183. Id. at 961. The court also sustained plaintiffs standing to sue and rejected defendants' claim that the issue was a nonjusticiable political question, applying established precedents. See id. at 957-61. Neither side sought Colorado
Supreme Court review.
184. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; see OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1 at 14547.
185. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 44.
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promptly after a decennial census. After the 2000 census
granted Colorado a seventh House seat, the General Assembly
attempted to agree on a districting plan in time for the 2002
election but failed, largely because different political parties
controlled the two houses. 186 A lawsuit was filed in Denver
District Court against the secretary of state, asserting that the
existing apportionment (based on six seats) was invalid and
asking the court to impose a plan to replace it. 187 After extensive proceedings, the court adopted one of the plans submitted
to it by the parties and ordered the secretary of state to conduct
the 2002 election under it.l8 8 The court's judgment was issued
on January 25, 2002,189 and appealed. The Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed on March 13.190 The decision was novel in the
Colorado courts but was presaged and supported by a 1982
Colorado federal court decision and by federal decisions arising
in other states. 191
In the 2002 election, the Republican Party gained control
of both houses of the General Assembly. In the closing days of
its 2003 session, the General Assembly passed a new districting plan, one more favorable to the majority party. The bill
was introduced on May 5, passed by both houses on May 7 (the
final day of the session), and signed into law on May 9.192
Two lawsuits challenged the validity of the 2003 districting
statute. Several citizens sued in Denver District Court, alleging procedural irregularities in the hasty consideration of the
bill. 193 A few days later, Colorado Attorney General Ken Salazar filed an original writ proceeding in the Colorado Supreme
Court against Secretary of State Donetta Davidson, asking the
court to take jurisdiction, hold the statute invalid, and rein-

186. See Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642, 645-46 (Colo. 2002). The legislature
tried but failed to agree on a plan during its regular session in 2001, during two
special sessions the same year, and during the first few weeks of the 2002 session.
Id. at 646.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 646-47.
189. Id. at 646.
190. Id. at 642.
191. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982) (cases cited at 78-79).
192. See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1250-51 (Colo. 2003).
193. The action alleged violations of COLO. CONST. art. V, §§ 20, 22 & art. II, §
10 and of COLO. REV. STAT. tit. 24, art. 6. See Davidson, 79 P.3d at 1227 (dissenting opinion).

1294

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

state the district court's 2002 apportionment. 194 Davidson opposed the petition, claiming that the attorney general could not
bring an original proceeding in that kind of case and could not
name the secretary of state as a respondent because he was
19 5
ethically obligated to represent her.
The supreme court set the case for argument and issued its
decision on December 1, ruling in favor of Salazar. 196 After deciding to entertain Salazar's petition, the court held that the
attorney general had standing and was not barred by an ethical obligation to Davidson. 197 On the merits, the court considered the relevant provision of the Colorado Constitution, the
second sentence of article V, section 44: "When a new apportionment shall be made by congress, the general assembly shall
198
divide the state into congressional districts accordingly."'
The court held that this provision restricts apportionment to
once per decade, following a census, reading the quoted sentence as if it began "when and only when." 199 Therefore, the
General Assembly has no authority to adopt a second, revised
apportionment during the decade. The court then determined
that the 2002 judicial districting plan constituted the one and
only redistricting allowed before the 2010 census. 20 0 This interpretation effectively confines the legislature's power to redistrict congressional seats to the period between the census
report and the closing date to establish precincts for the general election after the census, a period of about one year, in this
instance, from March 2001 to March 2002.201
In reaching its decision, the court rejected defendants'
challenge to its authority based on the Elections Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. 20 2 The relevant part of this provision states,

194. See Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221. The writ action was filed under COLO.
CONST. art. VI, § 3. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 165-67.
195. Davidson, 79 P.3d at 1225.
196. Id. at 1226.
197. Id. at 1229.
198. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 44.
199. Davidson, 79 P.3d at 1226.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 1243. Some claim that apportionment refers to congressional
allocation of seats to states, and the only proper term for the state's action is redistricting. See, e.g., Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 72 n.3 & authorities
cited (D. Colo. 1982). However, the Colorado Constitution has always preferred
the term "apportionment" for the districting function. See COLO. CONST. art. V, §
48; COLO. CONST. art. V, §§ 45, 49 (1876).
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 cl. 1. See Davidson, 79 P.3d at 1232.
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"The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof. ..

."

The claim is that this provision

commits exclusive authority over congressional redistricting to
state legislatures. The court rejected the claim based on U.S.
Supreme Court precedents approving state laws that submitted
reapportionment authority to state referendums and that sustained state gubernatorial vetoes. 20 3 Based on this federal issue, defendants sought certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Review was denied, but three dissenting justices (of the four
needed to grant review) wrote an opinion indicating that they
20 4
would likely have voted to reverse.
Meanwhile, defendants had removed the second suit challenging validity of the 2003 redistricting statute to federal district court. And a few days after the Colorado Supreme Court's
decision, a member of the General Assembly and three other
citizens who favored the legislature's 2003 reapportionment
filed a separate federal lawsuit that disputed the state court's
interpretation of the federal Elections Clause. Both federal
cases were heard by a three-judge federal district court. In the
removed case, that court held that because the federal question
had been decided by the Colorado Supreme Court, issue preclusion would bar its consideration when the state court case became final. 20 5 After denial of certiorari in the state case, the
federal court dismissed the removed case. 20 6 In the third,
original case, the federal court held that it lacked jurisdiction
over the Elections Clause issue because the lawsuit was an im20 7
proper attempt to appeal a state decision to a federal court.
2
0
8
This ruling was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
On

203. See Davidson, 79 P.3d at 1232. The court also pointed out that several
states have committed districting of congressional seats to nonpartisan commissions, although the Supreme Court has not yet determined their validity. See id.
204. Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Salazar, 541 U.S. 1093 (2004) (opinion of
Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ.). This issue was not addressed in
the opinions in Carstens, supra note 191, or Avalos, supra note 186. See generally
C. Bryan Wilson, What's a Federalist To Do? The Impending Clash Between Textualism and Federalism in State CongressionalRedistricting Suits Under Article
I, Section 4, 53 DUKE L. J. 1367 (2004) (commentary on judicial review of redistricting).
205. Keller v. Davidson, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (D. Colo. 2004).
206. Keller v. Davidson, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (D. Colo. 2004).
207. Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Colo. 2005), rev'd sub nom.
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006).
208. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006).
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remand, the district court dismissed on the merits. 20 9 This ruling was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the Elections Clause
2 10
claim.
The Colorado Supreme Court's holding, that article V section 44 limits the General Assembly to one reapportionment after each census and that the judicial districting constituted the
one, was hardly dictated by the constitutional text. This was
demonstrated by the court's dissenting opinion, which disagreed with both parts of the ruling. 21' The inference that the
legislature is limited to one reapportionment per census decade
was reasonable. The court pointed out that the original state
constitution expressly empowered the General Assembly to reapportion state legislative districts "from time to time," so the
court inferred that lack of such language in the provision for
apportioning congressional seats implicitly denied a like
power. 2 12 Like most inferences of implied negatives by omission, this was not conclusive, but it had some force, and the
dissent did not refute it directly. However, the second inference, that the judicial apportionment used up the one opportunity per decade, was more troublesome. Although districting is
a historically sordid act of self-interest by legislatures, the
relevant constitutional texts, state and federal, clearly committed the power to legislatures. Reapportionment by courts can
become necessary when legislatures fail to act, but the dissenters' argument that such judicial action should be temporary
had considerable force.
Partisan political aspects of this dispute were everywhere.
The General Assembly's 1 1th-hour apportionment bill in 2003
was of course a raw political act. But courts are supposed to
operate on a higher plane. Did they? The dissenters in the
Colorado Supreme Court were the two justices associated with
the Republican Party, while the majority justices had associa-

209. Lance v. Dennis, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (D. Colo. 2006), vacated in part,
aff'd in part sub nom., Lance v. Coffman, 127 S. Ct. 1194 (2007).
210. Lance v. Coffman, 127 S. Ct. 1194 (2007). Plaintiffs had also alleged a
claim under the Petitions Clause that was dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim; this ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 1198.
211. People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d at 1243-1253 (Kourlis, J.,
joined by Coats, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 1239.
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tions with the Democrats. 2 13 In the U.S. Supreme Court, the
three justices who indicated they would likely have overturned
the decision were that Court's most conservative members,
commonly associated with Republican Party positions and
2 14
states' rights.
F.

Article ViI-Voting Rights of Parolees

Article VII section 10 provides that persons confined in
prison shall not be entitled to vote, but voting rights are restored to persons who serve their "full term of imprisonment"
or who receive a pardon. 2 15 The applicable statute specifies
that persons confined for a felony conviction or who are "serving a sentence of parole" are ineligible to register or vote. 2 16 In
2006, parolees sued the state, claiming that the statute was invalid because their release from custody restored their right to
vote under the constitution. 2 17 However, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected their claim, interpreting the constitutional provision to include parole as part of the sentence; in
other words, that a person on parole remains in legal custody. 2 18
213. The five majority justices were appointed by Governor Roy Romer, a Democrat.
See
Colorado
Supreme
Court
Justices
Webpage,
http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/supctjustices.htm (follow hyperlinks on each
judge's name for date of appointment) (last visited May 14, 2007) [hereinafter
Justices
Webpage];
Colorado
State
Archives,
List
of
Governors,
http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doitlarchives/offic/gov.html (last visited Aug. 30,
2007). Dissenting Justice Coats was appointed by Republican Governor Owens.
See id; Justices Webpage, supra. Dissenting Justice Kourlis was also appointed
by Governor Romer but was identified as a Republican. See State Justice Touted
as Nominee, DENVER POST, July 12, 2005, at B-01.
214. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
215. COLO. CONST. art. VII, § (10).
216. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-103(4) (2007).
217. Danielson v. Dennis, 139 P.3d 688, 690 (Colo. 2006).
218. Id. at 692. The court had previously held that persons on probation or in
custody awaiting trial are entitled to vote; the Danielsoncourt distinguished those
decisions. Id. at 693.
A provision in a 2007 Colorado Senate bill proposed to amend the statute
to give parolees the vote. See sections 4 and 37 of the version of S.B. 07-83, 66th
Gen.
Assem.,
1st
Spec.
Sess.
(Colo.
2007),
available
at
http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2007a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/3BEB2FCE7EF9DO31
87257251007A4B33?open&file=083_ren.pdf. To try to conform to the court's interpretation of section 10, the measure specified that parole is not part of a convict's sentence. However, the House removed the provision from the bill before
passage. See Parolee Voting Provision Stripped, DENVER POST, Apr. 25, 2007,
available at http://www.denverpost.com/legislature/ci_5743224. See also The Sen-
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G. Article IX-School Vouchers
In 2003, the General Assembly enacted a pilot program to
entitle poor children in certain school districts to public support
to pay private school tuition. 2 19 However, the Colorado courts
held the statute unconstitutional. 220 Were the statute valid,
participation in the program was mandatory for school districts
with low academic performance ratings based on statewide
tests. 22 1 Private schools wishing to participate in the program
22 2
had to submit applications and meet statutory criteria.
Children who performed poorly in public schools within participating districts were entitled to have tuition support, in the
form of vouchers to their parents, to attend participating pri22 3
vate schools.
Soon after enactment, opponents filed suit in Denver District Court. The court held the statute invalid, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. 224 Plaintiffs made a number of
claims, notably that the statute violated provisions of the Colorado Constitution providing for local control of "instruction" in
public schools, prohibiting state aid to religious schools, and
prohibiting compulsory support for religion. 225 The district
court and supreme court sustained the local control claim and
2 26
did not rule on any of the others.

tencing
Project,
News
(May
10,
2007),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=414
(governor
threatened to veto bill if parolee voting included).
219. See COLO. REV. STAT. tit. 22, art. 56 (repealed 2004).
220. Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933 (Colo.
2004).
221. See id. at 936. The tests were those popularly known as CSAP, required
by the Educational Accountability Act as amended in 1997, found in COLO. REV.
STAT. tit. 22, art. 7 (2007). Id. Districts required to participate were those with
eight or more schools rated low or unsatisfactory based on CSAP tests. Id. At the
time, eleven Front Range districts fit this definition. Id. Other districts could
participate voluntarily. Id.
222. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-56-106 (repealed 2004).
223. See Colo. Cong. of Parents,Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d at 936. Because
it was a pilot program, participation was limited to 1% of a participating school
district's students in 2004-05, 2% in 2005-06, 4% in 2006-07, and 6% in 2007-08
and after. See id.
224. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933.
225. See id. at 936 n. 3; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15 (local control of instruction),
§ 7 (state aid to religious schools forbidden), art. II, § 4 (prohibiting compulsory
support of religion). Of course some private schools are not religious, but many
are.
226. Colo. Cong. of Parents,Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d at 935-36.
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The supreme court's decision centered on use of local
school funds to pay private school tuition. 227 As stated above,
the constitution guarantees local control of "instruction in the
public schools. ' 228 A competing provision commits "general supervision of the public schools" to the State Board of Education. 229 Several early decisions held that state statutes attempting to reallocate local funds were invalid under the local
control provision. 2 30 But a 1999 decision sustained partial
state authority over local districts under the Charter Schools
Act. 23 1 The court's decision overturning the voucher statute relied on the statute's reallocation of local funds and distinguished the 1999 decision. 2 32 Three dissenting justices would
have sustained the statute by limiting the constitution's local
control provision to public school curricula, rejecting or overruling the older decisions that had applied it to control over local
2 33
funds.
The decision made it clear that were only state funds involved, the enactment would not have violated the local control
provision. 234 Although not discussed in the case, the legislature might avoid the decision in another way, by conditioning
receipt of existing state support on school districts' compliance
with a voucher plan. Conditional federal funds are a routine
aspect of federal-state relations, 235 but conditional state funds
have not been directly at issue in Colorado's state-local disputes.
Were a statute enacted to authorize vouchers using only
state funds or by expressly conditioning state funds, opponents
would surely revive their claim that state aid to religious
schools is invalid. The court's most relevant precedent suggests that granting aid to parents rather than directly to paro-

227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 933.
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15.
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 207. The connection between

the local control provision and local funds was renewed in Lujan v. Colorado
Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982). See Colo. Cong. of Parents,
Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d at 940-41.
231. Bd. of Educ. of School Dist. No. 1 v. Booth, 984 P.2d 639 (Colo. 1999). See
OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 207-08.
232. Colo. Cong. of Parents,Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d at 937-44.
233. Id. at 944 (Kourlis, J., joined by Rice and Coats, JJ., dissenting).
234. See id. passim (majority opinion).
235. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note
147, at 734-36.
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chial schools does not violate the constitution. 2 36 That decision
involved higher education, so opponents can argue that primary and secondary education should be subject to a stricter
constitutional rule. The leading federal precedent rejected an
attack on vouchers under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, 23 7 but the Colorado Constitution's provision is
more specific. 238 On the other hand, if Colorado excludes religious schools from participation in grants to private schools, a
challenge could be mounted under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment. 2 39 Therefore, the outcome of such a case
is uncertain.
H. Article X-Hotel Taxes
In 1958, the Colorado Supreme Court held that city income
taxes are implicitly forbidden by article X section 17, authorizing the state income tax. 240 But in 1969 the court distinguished "occupational privilege taxes" levied at flat rates on
businesses and employees as valid excise taxes. 2 4 1 Then a
1976 decision overturned a town's tax on gross income, deciding that it was a forbidden income tax. 24 2 This led to an attack
on a Colorado Springs tax levied on utilities' gross income. The

236. See Am. United for Separation of Church & State Fund, Inc. v. State, 648
P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1982); OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 211-12.
237. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Plaintiffs in the voucher
case also alleged violation of the federal Constitution, but the Zelman decision
probably forecloses that claim. Id.
238. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (specifically forbidding funds for "sectarian"
schools).
239. The Supreme Court's most relevant precedent rejected a constitutional
right to state funding. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). An attack in Colorado would try to distinguish that case by claiming COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7 to be
a so-called little Blaine Amendment, based on anti-Catholic bias, distinguishing it
from Locke. See 540 U.S. at 723 n.7 (distinguishing little Blaine Amendment issue); id. at 726-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting, making the argument reserved by the
Court). For a scholarly analysis, see Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, The
Mistakes in Locke v. Davey and the Future of State Payments for Services Provided by Religious Institutions, 40 TULSA L. REV. 227, 249-50 (2004).
240. City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 329 P.2d 441, 446 (Colo. 1958). City
income taxes are now expressly forbidden under TABOR. COLO. CONST. art. X, §
20(8)(a).
241. City & County of Denver v. Duffy Storage & Moving Co., 450 P.2d 339
(Colo. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 2 (1969). Municipal occupation taxes
were first authorized by statute in 1891 and their validity first sustained by the
court in Parsons v. People, 76 P. 666 (Colo. 1904).
242. Town of Minturn v. Foster Lumber Co., Inc., 548 P.2d 1276 (Colo. 1976).
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city argued that it was a valid sales tax, but the court rejected
the claim, saying that the city's intent had been to levy an income tax, and the tax incidence was on the utilities and not on
their customers. 24 3 These issues returned to the court in 2000,
when a lawsuit challenged the town of Eagle's hotel tax, arguing that it was a forbidden tax on gross income. 244 But the
court sustained it as a valid occupation tax, reasoning that it
was levied at a fixed rate per room per day regardless of the
room charge, so it was not based on a percentage of gross income. 24 5 The issue these decisions leave open is whether a
home-rule city or town can rely on the dictum in the Colorado
Springs case to designate a tax measured by gross income as a
24 6
sales tax levied on buyers.

I.

Article X-TABOR
1.

2 47

Statewide TABOR Consent Votes

TABOR requires voter consent to increase or extend taxes,
to authorize government borrowing, and to exceed revenue limits defined by inflation and population changes. 248 The General Assembly asked voters to approve debt for Great Outdoors
Colorado in 2001, and voters agreed. 249 But a measure to bor-

243. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Colorado Springs, 572 P.2d 834
(Colo. 1977).
244. Town of Eagle v. Scheibe, 10 P.3d 648 (Colo. 2000).
245. Id. at 654.
246. See text accompanying note 243, supra.
247. For TABOR issues in addition to those discussed below, see Colo. Office of
Planning and Budgeting, Special Report: TABOR-The Taxpayers Bill of Rights
(Sept.
2004),
http://www.cde.state.co.us/artemis/gov3_10/GOV32T 12004INTERNET.pdf [hereinafter Off. Plan. & Budget. Rpt.]; Office of Legis. Leg. Svcs., Legis. Drafting
Man., Ch. 9, Article X, Section 20 - The Taxpayer's Bill Of Rights (TABOR) - 1992
Amendment
#1
(Jan.
2003),
http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/olls/LDMO9.0_Article_X,-Section-20.pdf
[hereinafter Legis. Drafting Man. Ch. 9].
248. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20. The text purports to limit spending rather
than revenue, but its definition makes clear that the limit is on revenue. Id. at §§
20(2)(e), 20(7). See infra text accompanying note 258. TABOR authorizes consent
votes to be held in a "state general election, biennial local district election, or on
the first Tuesday in November of odd-numbered years." Id. § 20(3)(a). The last
part of the definition differs from the standard American election day when November 1st falls on Tuesday of an odd-numbered year, as it did in 2005.
249. See
Colorado
Legislative
Council,
Ballot
Issue
History,
http://www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf/ (follow "2001" hyperlink; then fol-
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row for water projects failed in 2003.250 However, the most
important issues about consent were 2005 Referendums C and
D on state spending and debt limits, referred to voters by the
General Assembly. Voters approved C but rejected D. 2 5 1
Referendum C authorized the state to retain revenue in
excess of TABOR limits for five fiscal years (July 1, 2005 to
July 1, 2010) for specified but broad purposes (education,
health care, "strategic" transportation projects, and police and
firefighters' retirement plans) and established as the new
TABOR base the highest revenue year of the five. 252 Referendum D would have authorized the state to borrow for three
specified purposes (transportation, school construction, and fire
and police pensions), provided that Referendum C also
passed.253
Lawsuits to challenge the validity of Referendum C have
been threatened but not yet filed. 254 Although C involved a
statewide vote, it did not purport to amend the text of TABOR.
Hence opponents can argue that C is in conflict with TABOR.
The fact that C covers more than one tax year appears valid
based on Colorado Supreme Court decisions approving local
TABOR consent referendums lasting more than one tax
year.255 Moreover, the logic of those decisions extends as well
to C's provision changing the TABOR base to the highest allowed revenue level of C's five years. However, TABOR's text
does not expressly allow or forbid this provision. 2 56 In prior
cases of uncertainty, the Colorado Supreme Court has favored

low "Referendum" hyperlink; then follow "GOCO Bonds for Open Space" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 8, 2007). An earlier debt issue for the T-REX highway project was approved in 1999. See id. at 1999 hyperlink.
250. See
Colorado
Legislative
Council,
Ballot
Issue
History,
http://www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf/ (follow "2003" hyperlink; then follow "Referendum" hyperlink; then follow "Revenue Bonds for Water Projects" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 8, 2007).
251. Colorado Cumulative Report, Official Results, 2005 Coordinated Election,
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/electionresults2005/COLORADOCUMULATIVE.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007).
252. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-77-103.6, 106.5(1) (2007).
253. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 2005 STATE
BALLOT
INFORMATION
BOOKLET
13
(2005),
available
at
http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/lcsstaff/2005/ballot/2005Bluebookforlnterne
t.pdf.
254. See Chris Frates, Suit Contests Referendum D, DENVER POST, Oct. 7,
2005, at B1.
255. See infra text accompanying notes 270-71.
256. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(7).
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257
taxpayer democracy over strict readings of TABOR's text,
but no precedent directly addresses the validity of this part of
Referendum C.

2.

TABOR's Reductions of Government

Unless voters override it, TABOR's revenue cap reduces
the size of government in two ways, one gradual and relative,
the other sharp and absolute. TABOR limits increases in a
government's fiscal year "spending" to the amount in the prior
fiscal year adjusted for changes in population and inflation.
However, the term "spending" is misleading, as TABOR's definition of spending includes all revenue whether spent or not. It
states that fiscal year spending means all of a government's
"expenditures and reserve increases except. . reserve trans.. *"258 "Reserve" refers to a governfers or expenditures ..
ment's savings, so the definition includes saving as "spending,"
and spending out of savings as not "spending." The ordinary
meanings of spending and saving are the opposite.
The first effect of the TABOR revenue cap is gradually to
reduce the relative size of government. Over time the size of
the economy increases faster than population and inflation,259
so capping government revenue by these metrics reduces the
percentage of the economy in the public sector. The second and
much more drastic result has been dubbed TABOR's ratchet effect. 260 TABOR bases a fiscal year's revenue limits on the prior
year's actual revenues. An economic downturn such as that of
2001-04, or a tax reduction, causes government revenues to

257. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
258. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(2)(e).
259. For example, data from the U.S. Census Bureau show that from 1960 to
2005, U.S. population grew from 180,671,000 to 296,639,000, an increase of 64.2%.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2007,
During
POPULATION 7, http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/07statab/pop.pdf.
the same period, gross domestic product in constant ("chained") dollars grew from
$2,501.8 billion to $11,134.8 billion, an increase of 345.1%. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2007 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, INCOME EXPENDITURES AND WEALTH: GROSS
PRODUCT,
STATE
GROSS
AND
PRODUCT
DOMESTIC
http://www.census.gov/compendiastatab/income-expenditures wealth/gross-dom
esticproduct-and-gross-state-product/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2007).
260. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 2005 STATE BALLOT
(2005),
2
BOOKLET
INFORMATION
http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/lcsstaff/205[ballot/205Bluebookforlnterne
t.pdf.
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fall. This reduces the government's revenue base and thus its
revenue limit for the following year. Unless voters consent to
waive the limit, each such decline reduces government revenues below their previous TABOR baseline level, causing the
261
size of government to contract in absolute terms.
The legislature's cuts in the state income and sales taxes
in 1999-2000,262 combined with the economic downturn in
2001-04, caused the state's revenues to fall sharply. Moreover,
voters in 2000 mandated annual increases in spending on K-12
education. 263 The result was a huge reduction in state funds
for other purposes, and this in turn caused the legislature to
2 4
propose Referendum C. 6
The downturn also reduced revenues to local governments.
However, votes to override TABOR revenue limits on local governments are frequent and mostly successful. 2 65 Some munici266
palities have set aside their revenue caps indefinitely.
Statewide votes are another matter. Getting political consent
to put Referendum C on the ballot was difficult, and C was only
narrowly approved by voters. 26 7 Therefore another TABOR effect has been to reduce the relative size of state government
vis-A-vis local and thus to increase modestly the advantages of
26 8
more prosperous parts of the state.

261. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 254. A graph of the actual
ratchet effect at the state level appears in LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE COLO.
GEN. ASSEMBLY, 2005 STATE BALLOT INFORMATION BOOKLET 5 (2005),
http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/lcsstaff/2005/ballot/2005BluebookforInterne
t.pdf.
262. Act of June 4, 1999, ch. 333, 1999 Colo. Sess. Laws 1376 (codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. § 39-22-104 (2007)); Act of May 1, 2000, ch. 298, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws
1430, 1432 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-26-106 (2007)).
263. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 17; infra note 282.
264. 2005 Colo. Sess. Laws 2323. It also induced the legislature to transfer
cash from special funds to the general fund in order to balance the budget, a practice challenged in the courts. See infra notes 375-85 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., Havens v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 924 P.2d 517, 519 n.3 (Colo.
1996).
266. See, e.g., id.
267. See Colorado Cumulative Report, Official Results, 2005 Coordinated Election,
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/electionresults2005/COLORADOCUMULATIVE.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007).
268. Colorado is one of only four states in which local tax revenues exceed state
revenues. See CENTER FOR TAX POLICY, HOW COLORADO COMPARES: STATE TAXES
AND
SPENDING
12
(2006),
http://www.centerfortaxpolicy.org/reports/How ColoradoCompares.pdf [hereinafter How COLORADO COMPARES].
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The ratchet effect could be greatly eased by amending
TABOR to give the term "spending" its ordinary meaning, omitting savings but including spending out of savings. A government could then set aside revenue in fat years (such as the late
1990s) and spend it in lean years (such as 2001-04), reducing
or eliminating the ratchet effect. However, there does not appear to be any organized effort to seek such an amendment to
26 9
TABOR.
Essential background decisions that allowed the state to
conduct the 2005 referendums were several supreme court decisions in the 1990s that sustained voters' consent to exceed
TABOR limits over more than one year. 2 70 A 2002 decision
271
sustained an indefinite waiver of a county's revenue limits.
Another waiver was interpreted to include pre-TABOR statu272
tory limits that TABOR converted into constitutional caps.
3.

TABOR and Arveschoug-Bird

Referendum C revived another regulation of state revenue.
In 1991, a statute known as the Arveschoug-Bird Amendment
imposed a statutory limit of 6% on annual increases in appropriations to the general fund, although it allows revenue above
the limit to go to reserve accounts and capital construction projects. 2 73 After TABOR's revenue limit became effective in 1993,
269. A much more specific and limited method to establish a reserve fund to
cushion the ratchet effect was proposed in 2005, and a resolution to submit it to
voters was introduced in the General Assembly but not adopted. H. Con. Res. 051004, 65th Gen. Assem., 1st. Sess. (Colo. 2005). A different resolution to establish
a limited reserve fund was introduced in the General Assembly in 2006 but not
adopted. H. Con. Res. 06-1002, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Colo. 2006).
270. The most important was Havens v. Board of County Commissioners, 924
P.2d 517, 523 (Colo. 1996) (sustaining vote approving county's measure to retain
revenue above TABOR limits for four-year period). See also In re Interrogatories
on H.B. 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549, 558 (Colo. 1999) (approving multiple-year revenue
anticipation notes if voters consent); City of Aurora v. Acosta, 892 P.2d 264, 271
(Colo. 1995) (sustaining sales tax increase); Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d
215, 232-34 (Colo. 1995) (sustaining multi-year property tax increase to retire
bonds); OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 254-55, 272.
271. Havens v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 58 P.3d 1165, 1168 (Colo. Ct. App.
2002).
272. Wilber v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 42 P.3d 49 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (regarding COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-301(a)(1) (2007), originally passed in 1915, limiting
property tax revenue increases to 5.5% per year).
273. 1991 Colo. Sess. Laws.908-14 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §
24-75-201.1 (2007)). This reduced a 7% limit passed in 1977. 1977 Colo. Sess.
Laws 1794. Arveschoug- Bird imposes the lesser of 6% of the previous general

1306

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

the general fund was limited by the stricter of the two limits.
For the first three years under TABOR, Arveschoug-Bird was
the operative limit, then TABOR became stricter, then neither
applied during the downturn years after 2001.274 Referendum
C suspended the TABOR limit in 2005 but expressly retained
Arveschoug-Bird. 2 75 In 2005-06, revenues increased more
than 6%, so Arveschoug-Bird capped appropriations to the general fund. 27 6 Additional revenue was allocated to reserve accounts and to capital construction projects, particularly for
highways. 2 77 Forecasters say that revenues will increase more
27 8
than 6% in each of the remaining years of Referendum C.
These events raised the question whether TABOR requires
voter consent to amend Arveschoug-Bird's statutory 6% limit.
The relevant TABOR text states, "Other limits on district revenue, spending, and debt may be weakened only by future voter
approval. ' 2 79 Arveschoug-Bird does not limit the state's debt,
so the key questions are whether its regulation of the allocation
of revenue between the general fund and other uses is a "limit"
on "revenue" or "spending" and whether any shift in the formula would cause it to be "weakened." In other words, does the
TABOR clause regulate only how much money can be raised or
spent overall, or does it also regulate the allocation of revenue
and spending between operating, reserve, and capital accounts?
Opinions of the legislature's Office of Legislative Legal Services
concluded that TABOR prevents raising Arveschoug-Bird's 6%
limit, but the opinions gave the word "spending" in the quoted
TABOR provision its ordinary meaning rather than the special

fund and 5% of state personal income, but because personal income has risen
faster than state revenues, the 6% limit is much more restrictive than the 5%
limit on state personal income. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. The
general fund is defined in COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-75-201 (2007).
274. See Off. Plan. & Budget. Rpt., supra note 247.
275. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-77-103.6(3) (2007) (Ref. C), applying id. § 2475-201.1(1)(a)(II) (Arveschoug-Bird) to revenues retained under Ref. C.
276. See Colorado Legislative Council Staff, Memorandum to Members of the
General
Assembly
2-3
(Jun.
20,
2007),
http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/lcsstaff/lcs/focus/2007/07ForecastO620.pdf
[hereinafter June 20 Memo].
277. Id. at 1-3. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-75-201.1(d), 24-75-218, 39-26-123
(2007).
278. See June 20 Memo, supra note 276, at 3.
279. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(1). For other applications of this provision, see
infra notes 299, 303 and accompanying text.
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TABOR definition that includes savings. 2 80 If the TABOR
definition of "spending" to mean overall revenue is applied,
nothing in its text regulates allocation of revenue among operational spending, saving, and capital investment.
Even if TABOR does not require voter consent to amend
Arveschoug-Bird, legislators may be reluctant to tamper with
Referendum C, which was adopted by a statewide vote that expressly retained it. Still a further complication is a provision
within Arveschoug-Bird that requires the General Assembly to
consider its modification whenever "the general assembly significantly restructures the method by which elementary, secondary, or post-secondary education in this state is financed. ' '2 8 1 This has occurred at least twice since 1991,2 8 2 but
no action has been taken.
4.

Property Taxes for Schools

School support has always been Colorado's largest public
expense, so paying for schools is naturally the state's biggest
tax issue. 2 83 Once mostly local, school support is now more
than sixty percent a state expense. 2 84 In 1952 the legislature
crafted the first Public School Finance Act to govern this subject, since replaced by similar acts passed in 1962, 1969, 1973,

280. See Colo. Gen. Assembly, Office of Legis. Leg. Svcs. Memo. 1 n.1, 6 (1 Nov.
2004),
http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/olls/PDF/ARVESCHOUGBIRD%20GENERAL%20FUND%20APPROPRIATIONS%20LIMIT.PDF.
On the
special TABOR definition of spending, see supra text at note 258. A 1995 attorney
general's opinion concluded that transfers from the general fund to the capital
construction fund for highway construction did not violate Arveschoug-Bird or
TABOR, but it assumed without deciding that Arveschoug-Bird's 6% limit is subject to the quoted TABOR limit. Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. 95-3, 1995 Colo. AG LEXIS
4, at 2.
281. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-75-201.1(1)(a)(VI) (2007).
282. An initiated amendment to the Colorado Constitution approved in 2000
mandates increases in state funding for K-12 education. See COLO. CONST. art.
IX, § 17. The legislature necessarily reexamined school funding to carry out this
requirement. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-54-104 to -104.2 (2007). In 2004, the
legislature extensively revised the system for funding higher education. See
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 23-18-101 to -208 (2007).
283. See Long Appropriations Bill, S.B. 07-239, 66th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 2007) (K-12 education 42.5% of state budget and its largest category); Boulder
Country
Budget
Summary
2007,
http://www.co.boulder.co.us/budget/BudgetBrief07.pdf (51% of all property tax
went to education, the largest category).
284. See HOW COLORADO COMPARES, supra note 268, at 5.
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1988, and 1994.285 A section of each act allocated state and local shares of school expense and defined the local tax effort required to qualify for state support. 2 86 Relevant here is part of
the section passed in 1994, soon after TABOR took effect. For
purposes of the state-local funding program, it limited school
districts' property tax levy to the "number of mills that may be
levied by the district under the property tax revenue limitation
imposed on the district by [TABOR]. '' 287 For districts where
tax bases grew faster than TABOR revenue limits allowed, the
TABOR caps forced cuts in the mill levy.288
In 2007, the legislature repealed the statutory TABOR restriction except for districts that have not voted to allow their
schools to retain revenues exceeding TABOR limits. 2 89 Most
districts have voted to do so. 2 90 For them, the effect of the
amendment was to define their levy under one of the other caps
in the statute. 2 9 1 For most of them, the operative limit became
the levy in force in the previous tax year, so the press called the
amendment a tax freeze. 292 But as noted above, in many dis-

285. See Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Colo. 1982);
1952 Colo. Sess. Laws 27; 1962 Colo. Sess. Laws 247-51; 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws
1046-48; 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 1240-42; 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws 778-802; 1994
Colo. Sess. Laws 776-827 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-54-101
- 22-54-120 (2007)).
286. See, e.g., 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws 792-98.
287. 1994 Colo. Sess. Laws 791 (formerly codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-54106(2)(a)(II1) (2006)). This was one of three mill levy caps; COLO. REV. STAT. § 2254-106(2)(a) required the lowest of the three.
288. See Bell
Policy
Center,
School Districts Mill
Levy Freeze,
http://www.thebell.org/issues/fiscal/millfreeze.php (last visited Aug. 15, 2007);
COLORADO CHILDREN'S CAMPAIGN, UNDERSTANDING MILL LEVY STABILIZATION IN
COLORADO (2007), http://www.coloradokids.org/includes/downloads/milllevy.pdf
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING MILL LEVY STABILIZATION].
289. 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 733 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-54106(2)(a)(III) (2007)). The other two caps remain in § 22-54-106(2)(a), and a new
overall cap of twenty-seven mills was added. The latter applies to a few districts
that had high levies owing to declining enrollment and low property tax bases.
See Bell Policy Center, Bell Supports Gov. Ritter's School District Mill Levy
Freeze (Apr. 13, 2007), http://www.thebell.org/issues/fiscal/millfreeze2.php (last
visited Aug. 28, 2007).
290. See Press Release, Office of Gov. Bill Ritter, Jr. (Mar. 29, 2007),
http://www.colorado.gov/governor/press/march07/school-finance.html;
Editorial,
Legislature Should Pass Gov. Ritter's Plan to Bolster School District Funding,
DENVER POST, May 1, 2007, at B6 (noting that 175 of Colorado's 178 school districts have voted to retain excess revenues).
291. UNDERSTANDING MILL LEVY STABILIZATION, supra note 288, at 4.
292. See Mike Littwin, Property-Tax Freeze Heated, ROcKY MTN. NEWS, May
12,
2007,
available
at
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tricts the frozen mill levy will be applied to larger assessed
valuations and therefore cause tax bills to rise.
Soon after passage of the 2007 repeal, a lawsuit was filed
claiming that without voter approval, the amendment violates
TABOR. 293 The threshold issue in the case is how to interpret
the 1994 statutory text, which has two plausible meanings.
One is simply to place in the statute the limit that TABOR otherwise imposes on the revenues of each school district. If this
is correct, the 2007 repeal is valid because it applies only to
school districts that have voted to remove TABOR's revenue
limits. The alternative interpretation is that the 1994 provision is an independent restriction on school district tax levies.
Plaintiffs in the lawsuit can argue that the former interpretation would be redundant because TABOR imposes that limit
anyway, and statutes should be interpreted to give them operative meaning. 294 Defendants can respond that many statutes
passed soon after TABOR took effect simply duplicated its re2 95
quirements.
If the 1994 provision were an independent restriction, did
the legislature have authority to impose it? The answer is almost certainly yes. Whatever question there might be about
state control over school taxes in the abstract, the provision in
question was a condition for receipt of state funds and surely
296
valid as such.
If the 1994 provision were a valid,' independent restriction,
did the 2007 amendment contravene TABOR? It did not violate TABOR's specific requirements of voter approval for a new
tax, tax rate increase, higher mill levy, or increase in assessment valuation. 29 7 The case depends instead on two general
TABOR provisions: one requires voter approval for a "tax policy
change directly causing a net tax revenue gain to any dishttp://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/newscolumnists/article/0, 1299,DRMN
86 5533546,00.html.
293. See Mesa County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Co. Dep't of Educ., No.
2007CV12064 (Denver Dist. Ct. Dec. 13, 2007).
294. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 19 P.3d 1263, 1273
(Colo. 2001).
295. Compare, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(2)(d) with COLO. REV. STAT. § 2477-102(3) (2007) (definition of enterprise repeated); COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(5)
with COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-77-104(1) (2007) (requirement'of emergency reserve
largely duplicated); COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(3)(b) with COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40125(2) (2007) (election requirement largely duplicated).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 234-35.
297. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(a).
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trict" 29 8 ; the second states, "[o]ther limits on district revenue
299
may be weakened only by future voter approval.
If read literally and strictly, TABOR's requirement of voter
approval for a "tax policy change directly causing a net tax
revenue gain to any district" would require voter approval for a
law that improved methods to enforce taxes against scofflaws
or for a "supply side" tax cut that lowered tax rates for the purpose of increasing revenues. These and other examples make it
unlikely that the courts will read it literally, to outlaw any unapproved increase in tax revenue.
Finding a way to confine the provision to sensible boundsyet ones not already prohibited by TABOR's specific ban on any
new tax, tax rate increase, higher mill levy, or increase in assessment valuation-is challenging. One approach would focus
on the modifier "directly" in the text. However, a law improving tax collection methods is at least as direct as the 2007
amendment removing the property tax cap. Another approach
would focus on the words "net tax revenue gain" and limit application to changes in laws or policies that explicitly restrict
revenue. The 1994 law is such a law, so this interpretation
would invalidate it if it is an independent restriction. 30 0 As explained in the next paragraph, this also makes the two TABOR
limits quite similar in scope.
The second TABOR challenge, that other "limits on district
revenue . . . may be weakened only by future voter approval,"
can also be read to require a vote to authorize a law that improves tax collections or that enacts a "supply-side" tax cut that
increases revenues, and similar hypotheticals, so it also is
unlikely to be read literally. However, its scope is "limits on
district revenue," a less sweeping phrase than "tax policy
change." Confining it to measures that are explicit limits on
revenue is a reasonable reading and avoids overbroad applications. Applying that reading, the 1994 statute is by its terms a
limit on district revenue. Therefore, if the 1994 statute is an
298. Id.
299. Id. at § 20(1). For other issues arising under this provision, see text accompanying note 279, supra, and note 303, infra.
300. Contrast COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-606(4)-(5) (2007). This statute requires estimated payments of severance taxes. Until 2007, it required quarterly
payments; as amended payments are due monthly. This was intended to increase
interest revenue to the state. See June 20 Memorandum, supra note 277, at 10.
However, the statute is not an explicit limit on revenue, so the change should not
violate TABOR.
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independent restriction, it appears to be subject to the "future
voter approval" clause of this TABOR provision.
Opponents of the statute also claimed that the previous local votes waiving TABOR limits on school district revenues
were invalid because their ballot titles failed to indicate that a
tax increase was involved or were misleading. 30 ' This claim
30 2
confronts statutes of limitations and negative precedents.
5.

Did TABOR Override Preexisting Indexed and
Variable Taxes?

The political branches have reached inconsistent decisions
when applying TABOR to preexisting tax laws that require
administrative or legislative increases. The legal question is
whether TABOR's general provisions that "supersede all conflicting state constitutional [and]

statutory .

.

.

provisions"

overrode preexisting laws calling for tax rate and assessment
increases so that voter consent is required by TABOR's bans on
30 3
unconsented tax or revenue increases.
The most important situation to date concerned unemployment insurance taxes that are paid by most employers.
The statutory scheme calculates taxes based on complex and
fluctuating formulas. 30 4 Soon after TABOR became effective,
an attorney general's opinion concluded that TABOR was not
inconsistent with the unemployment scheme. 30 5 Its statutory
tax increases could continue because the formula was in place
before TABOR and "unemployment taxes are calculated based
on established objective criteria." 30 6 However, TABOR would
require voter consent if the formula were changed to increase

301. See supra note 293.
302. See infra text at notes 360-69.
303. COLO. CONST. art. X § 20(1), (4)(a). TABOR rules that could apply are
those requiring voter consent to any weakening of revenue limits, to any new tax,
to any tax or mill levy or assessment ratio increase, or to any tax policy change
directly causing a net revenue gain. Id.
304. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-76-101 to 115 (2007).
305. Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 93-4, 1993 Colo. AG LEXIS 4. Op. Colo. Att'y
Gen. No. 93-3, 1993 WL 380753, is substantially the same. The opinions cited
only the "new tax" and "tax increase" bans in COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(a).
306. Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 93-4 at 2. The state's unemployment compensation act is based on and must comply with federal unemployment insurance laws.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3308 (2000). Therefore, TABOR invalidation of its tax provision could have undermined the entire act.
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tax rates or revenue. 30 7 Another attorney general's opinion
concluded that TABOR did not forbid the fluctuating "surcharge" required by the workers' compensation act because, although imposed on insurers, it was a fee and not a tax. 30 8 A
series of opinions allowed mill levy fluctuations under a 1915
statute that limits certain property tax revenue increases to
5.5% over the prior year. 30 9 Two other opinions concluded that
sunset provisions in statutes granting tax breaks are not canwith sunset provisions
celed by TABOR. 3 10 Income tax credits
311
have expired without a TABOR vote.
In 1990, Colorado voters adopted an amendment to the
Constitution authorizing limited gaming in Central City,
Blackhawk, and Cripple Creek. 3 12 The amendment authorized
a tax of up to 40% on the gross proceeds of gaming enterprises,
established the Limited Gaming Commission with power to set
3 13
the tax annually, and directed allocation of the tax proceeds.
In 1991, the legislature passed a gaming tax statute that
tracks the amendment. 3 14 The Limited Gaming Commission's
rules provide for setting the tax annually, and since 1993, it

307. Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 93-4 at 3.
308. Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 93-7, 1993 Colo. AG LEXIS 7. On fees and taxes
under TABOR, see infra text at notes 334-51.
309. Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 99-5, 1999 Colo. AG LEXIS 7; id No. 98-2, 1998
Colo. AG LEXIS 2; id. No. 93-8, 1993 Colo. AG LEXIS 8 (interpreting COLO. REV.
STAT. § 29-1-301 (2007)). See Wilber v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 42 P.3d 49 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2001) (sustaining county vote to exceed the 5.5% limit), discussed supra
note 272 and accompanying text.
310. Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 95-2, 1995 Colo. AG LEXIS 3, concluded that the
automatic repeal of a pre-TABOR sales tax exemption for precious metal bullion
and coins was not a tax policy change requiring voter approval. Op. Colo. Att'y
Gen. No. 07-01, 2007 Colo. AG LEXIS 1, at 8-9, cited the 1995 opinion favorably
and stated that the same conclusion was appropriate for post-TABOR tax exemption statutes with automatic sunsets, citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-519 (1994)
(tax credit for use of vehicles in transportation of sludge, enacted in 1994 and
automatically repealed in 1999), id. § 39-22-128 (2007) (weather related livestock
sale credit for period 2002-04), and id. § 39-22-121 (2007) (50% tax credit for contributions to child care facility for period 1999-2010).
311. Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 07-01, 2007 Colo. AG LEXIS 1, at 10, citing 1998
memo by Office of Legislative Legal Services.
312. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9.
313. Id. § 9(5). Part of the proceeds are allocated to pay the gaming commission's expenses and might be characterized as a fee rather than a tax, but most of
the proceeds are plainly tax receipts.
314. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47.1-601 (2007).
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has raised the tax several times. 3 15 The Commission therefore
appears to view itself as not constrained by TABOR. 316
In 1977, the legislature imposed a severance tax on coal
extraction. 3 17 The statute set a specific rate per ton of coal,
provided for adjustment of the rate based on changes in the
federal index of producers' prices for all commodities, and required that the executive director of the department of revenue
calculate the adjustment. 3 18 When TABOR took effect, the director decided that TABOR precluded increases in the tax rate
without voter approval, 3 19 and this has remained the operative
rule. However, a 2007 attorney general's opinion concluded
that the director had been mistaken, and the tax should have
320
been raised.
Another question is presented by application of TABOR to
the 1982 amendment to article X, section 3 governing property
tax assessments. Popularly called the Gallagher Amendment,
this provision set the assessed valuation of residential property
at 21% of actual value and that of other property at 29%.321 It
also required that the 1985 ratio of total statewide valuation
for assessment of residential property to that for nonresidential
property remain fixed. To accomplish this, it required future
Rule
14
at
315. See
the
Commission's
http://www.revenue.state.co.us/Gaming/documents/rulel4.pdf.
316. See memo of telephone conversation with Deputy Att'y Gen. Jason R.
Dunn, July 25, 2007 (on file with author). In Interrogatories on S.B.93-74, 852
P.2d 1, 12-15 (Colo. 1993), the supreme court replied to an interrogatory from the
legislature asking if it had authority to restrict limited gaming tax revenues in
order to comply with TABOR's revenue limit. The court held that the legislature
lacked such authority. The opinion described the Commission's taxing authority
in the context of the TABOR revenue issue, but it said nothing about validity of
the tax. However, it is possible that the opinion encouraged the Commission to
believe that TABOR did not override its taxing authority. In 2006, the attorney
general issued an opinion on control over Gaming Division personnel and budget.
Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 06-05, 2006 Colo. AG LEXIS 4. The opinion again recited
the Commission's taxing authority but did not discuss its validity under TABOR.
Id.
317. 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1846 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §
39-29-106 (2007)).
318. Id. § 106(1), (5).
319. Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 07-01, 2007 Colo. AG LEXIS 1. After TABOR became effective, the legislature amended the law to reduce the effective tax in several ways, and these reductions are subject to TABOR's requirements for voter
consent to increases. See 1994 Colo. Sess. Laws 334 & 1999 Colo. Sess. Laws 926
(codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-29-106(1), (2) (2007)). But the preexisting provision for automatic adjustment of the tax rate remains in effect. Id. § 106(5).
320. Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 07-01, 2007 Colo. AG LEXIS 1.
321.
See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 233-34.
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adjustment of the residential assessed valuation percentage as
needed to maintain the ratio, which turned out to be roughly
47% residential to 53% nonresidential. 32 2 To comply, the legislature established a system of revaluation and adjustment of
the residential assessed valuation percentage every two
years. 3 23 After 1985, the statewide assessed value of residential property grew much faster than that of nonresidential.
The legislature maintained the required valuation ratio by reducing the assessed valuation percentage for residential property so that the aggregate residential assessed valuation remained at about 47%.324 Accordingly, the assessed valuation
percentage for residential property fell every two years from
the 1985 figure of 21% to the 1997 figure of 9.74%.325
In 1999, for the first time under this scheme, the aggregate
value of nonresidential property increased more than that of
residential, so the Gallagher formula called for an increase in
However, legislative
the residential valuation percentage.
leaders decided that TABOR forbade this, so rather than increase the residential percentage, the legislature maintained it
at the 1997 figure. 326 The relative increase in residential assessments resumed in 2001, and the residential percentage
continued to be reduced, reaching 7.96% in 2003.327 In 2005
and 2007, the nonresidential aggregate again increased more
than the residential, but the legislature again declined an increase and maintained the 2003 figure. 3 28 In 1999, 2005, and
2007, the upward adjustment in the residential percentage

322. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, RESEARCH
PUBLICATION NO. 515-0, ANALYSIS OF THE 2003 BALLOT PROPOSALS (BLUE BOOK)
4-5,
http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/csstaff/2003/ballot/2003bluebookforinternet
2.pdf.
323. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-1-104(10.2), 39-1-104.2 (2007).
324. See Colo. Dep't of Local Affairs Div. of Property Taxation, Report to the
General Assembly: Estimated Residential Assessment Rate for 2007-2008 PursuApr.
2007),
39-1-104.2(6),
C.R.S.
18-19
(13
ant
to
http://www.dola.state.co.us/dpt/dptnews/docs/AprilReportO4l3O7.pdf [hereinafter
Report to the General Assembly].
325. See id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-104.2 (2007).
326. See Report to the General Assembly, supra note 324, at 18-19.
327. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-104.2(3)(i) (2007).
328. Id. § 39-1-104.2(3)(j, k). See Report to the General Assembly, supra note
324, at 1, 19.
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called for by Gallagher would have been modest, 32 9 so the consequences of the decision not to raise the residential percentage
were slight. However, the issue could become more significant
if the value of nonresidential property were to undergo a sustained and significant increase.
In all the situations involving pre-TABOR laws, competing
legal rules can be invoked on both sides of the legal question
whether TABOR overrode preexisting laws calling for tax rate
and assessment increases. TABOR's comprehensive terms are
a straightforward argument for repeal. Countering it are the
rule that repeals by implication are not favored, and the rule
that general laws usually do not override specific ones. 3 30 The
TABOR terms are explicit but do not specifically address the
issues posed here. New laws, including TABOR, are normally
prospective in operation, a proposition suggested by TABOR's
term "supersede." 33 1 However, the tax rises at issue occur after
TABOR took effect, so they are in a sense prospective.
Another factor of possible relevance is that the preexisting
provisions in the limited gaming law and in Gallagher are constitutional provisions, of equal dignity with TABOR, while the
other taxes are statutory. A third possible issue arises from
the form of the increase provisions. Gallagher and the statutory tax laws provide for mandatory increases pursuant to fixed
formulas involving no administrative discretion, while the limited gaming law calls for discretionary action by the Commission. No court has considered any of these issues. The nearest
precedents held that pre-TABOR voter consents to tax or revenue increases were not overridden by TABOR. 332 Of course,
the courts will not address these issues unless a taxpayer attacks the taxes that have risen, or the political branches impose the increases mandated by the original terms of the coal

329. See Report to the General Assembly, supra note 324, at 1, 20 (1999 rate
would have been 9.83% instead of 9.74%; 2005 rate 8.17% and 2007 rate 8.19%
instead of 7.96%).
330. See, e.g., the majority and dissenting opinions on a similar issue of statutory law in West v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037, 1044-47 (Colo. 2006).
331. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(1).
332. See Bolt v. Arapahoe County Sch. Dist. No. 6, 898 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1995)
(post-TABOR mill levy increase valid based on pre-TABOR voters' consent); Bruce
v. Pikes Peak Library Dist., 155 P.3d 630 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) (same). See also
Nicholl v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 896 P.2d 859, 861 (Colo. 1995) ("[D]ebt and
revenue expenditures . . . approved by the voters prior to the effective date of
[TABOR] are not subject to [TABOR].").
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tax 3 33

or Gallagher. Their'reluctance in the latter case could
be explained by the political sensitivity of residential property
tax rates.
6.

Taxes, Fees, and Special Assessments Under
TABOR

Another TABOR lawsuit depended on the distinction between a tax that requires prior consent under TABOR and a fee
for service that does not. In 1989, before TABOR, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that a Fort Collins "transportation utility
fee" was not a tax subject to the uniformity requirement of article X section 3.334 The court defined fees broadly: they need
not be voluntary, and their relation to the service need not be
an exact match. 3 35 After TABOR became effective in 1993, the
distinction took on added significance. In addition to TABOR's
requirement of prior voter consent for a new tax, TABOR exempts from all its restrictions a government "enterprise," defined as a "government-owned business" that receives less than
10% of its revenue from other units of government. 3 36 TABOR
enterprises cannot themselves have any power to tax, 337 So
they are supported at least 90% by their own fees. Prominent
examples of TABOR enterprises are the E-470 toll road authority and the University of Colorado. 33 8 TABOR thus makes the
tax/fee distinction a general question of constitutional law. The
new issue was quietly recognized by the Legislative Drafting
Office in 1993, and it issued guidelines. 3 39 In the same year,
an attorney general's opinion concluded that TABOR did not
333. The Department of Revenue held a public hearing on Oct. 2, 2007, to consider whether to follow the AG's opinion and raise the tax. See also Colorado Confidential, http://www.coloradoconfidential.com/showDiary.do?diaryld=2530
(last
visited Sept. 28, 2007) (blog discussing this tax).
334. Bloom v. City of Ft. Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 305 (Colo. 1989). See Zelinger
v. City & County of Denver, 724 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Colo. 1986) (sustaining storm
drainage fee); OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 236. Article X, section 3 of
the Colorado Constitution requires that property taxes be uniform but does not
apply to other taxes. OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 236.
335. Bloom, 784 P.2d at 310-11.
336. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(2)(b), (d).
337. The supreme court interpreted TABOR to require that enterprises have
no power to tax. Nicholl, 896 P.2d at 869.
338. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-4-502 (2007); University of Colorado 2005 Financial
Report,
https://www.cusys.edu/controller/documents/CompleteCUSupplemental2005.pdf.
339. See Legisl. Drafting Man. Ch. 9, supra note 247, at 10-11.
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forbid raising the "surcharge" required by the workers' compensation act because, although imposed on insurers, it was a
fee and not a tax. 340 But the question did not generate a public
controversy until a decade later.
In 2001, pursuant to a voter-approved cable television
franchise agreement, Colorado Springs and its cable service
provider agreed to charge each subscriber fees for use of the
city's rights-of-way and for construction of a dark fiber system
for the city. 34 1 The next year the city imposed a fee to cover the
power and capital costs of the city's streetlights. A 2003 lawsuit alleged that these charges were taxes subject to TABOR
and thus invalid for want of prior voter approval. 34 2 The city
argued that the charges were properly characterized as fees for
services and thus not subject to TABOR, invoking the 1989
Fort Collins decision. The court of appeals agreed with the city
and sustained the charges. 343 The court acknowledged that
this opens the way for many local charges to avoid prior
TABOR approval but said that issue was for the supreme
court.344 However, that court denied review, two justices dissenting. 34 5 Still another Colorado Springs fee, for storm water
drainage, is the subject of a pending TABOR challenge. 34 6 The
issue arose at the state level in 2007, when the legislature im-

340. Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 93-7, 1993 Colo. AG LEXIS 7. See also supra text
at note 308.
341. Bruce v. City of Colorado Springs, 131 P.3d 1187, 1189 (Colo. Ct. App.
2005). Dark fiber is optical fiber dedicated to a single customer, here the city,
where the customer is responsible for attaching the telecommunications equipment and lasers to "light" the fiber. It greatly reduces internet use costs for institutional customers such as cities and schools. See Bill St. Arnaud, Frequently
Asked Questions About Customer Owned Dark Fiber, Condominium Fiber, Community
and
Municipal
Fiber
Networks
3,
http://www.canarie.ca/canet4/library/customer/frequentlyaskedquestionsaboutdar
kfiber.pdf.
342. Bruce v. City of Colorado Springs, 131 P.3d at 1189. Plaintiff was Douglas Bruce, author of TABOR. Id. The cable franchise agreement had been approved by voters, but the ballot measure had not complied with TABOR's wording
requirements to approve a tax. Id.
343. Id. at 1189-92.
344. Id. at 1191. A dissenting judge would have found the charges to be taxes
subject to TABOR. Id. at 1193-95 (Graham, J., dissenting). The dissent cited
Okeson v. City of Seattle, 78 P.3d 1279 (2003), holding a similar street light charge
to be a tax under Washington law. Id. at 1193-94.
345. Bruce v. City of Colorado Springs, 2006 Colo. LEXIS 237 (Colo. 2006).
346. Bruce v. City of Colorado Springs, No. 07CV0244 (El Paso Dist. Ct.).
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posed a fee for solid waste) disposal. 347 Opponents called it a
tax, requiring a TABOR vote. 348 Potential disputes are many,
349
as all levels of government impose numerous fees,
The fee versus tax dispute in these cases is of relatively
modest importance because government income from fees is
usually subject to TABOR's revenue cap. 350 As explained
above, the issue has much greater import to define the scope of
a TABOR enterprise because enterprise income is not subject
351
to the revenue cap.
Special assessments are charges imposed by governments
for specific local improvements. They are not mentioned in
TABOR, so a further question is whether they are taxes for
TABOR purposes. Their historical use has been by local governments for construction and repair of improvements such as
roads, sewers, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, and parks. They have
had a rocky history in Colorado law, in and out of the Constitution, 352 but their modern definition is reasonably stable. They

347. 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 1133, 1141 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-16104.5, 25-17-202 (2007)). See also 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 1441, 1454, 1457 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-8-501.1, 25-8-502, 25-10-104 (2007)) (increasing
fees for waste water systems).
348. See Peter Blake, A Fee By Any Other Name, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 7,
2007,
available
at
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/opinioncolumnists/article/0,2777,DR
MN_239725399253,00.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
349. See, e.g., June 20 Memo, supra note 276, at 8 (twenty-eight bills in 2007
legislative session imposed or raised fees estimated to yield $122.2 million).
350. See COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(2)(e) (definition of spending).
351. See id. §§ 20(2)(b), (d); 20(7).
352. From territorial times, statutes have authorized municipal special assessments. See COLO. TERR. REV. STAT. ch. LXXXIV, art. VII, §§ 2-3 (1868); COLO.
GEN. LAWS 1877, ch. C, 2655, § 14
75. An 1881 case challenged a special assessment for sidewalks in Denver. The supreme court held that the assessment
could not be sustained under the power to tax but was valid as a police power
regulation. Palmer v. Way, 6 Colo. 106 (1881). The court said in dictum that a
special assessment to build streets would be invalid under article X, section 3 of
the Colorado Constitution, which requires that "each property tax levy shall be
uniform." Id. at 109-12. In City of Pueblo v. Robinson, 21 P. 899 (Colo. 1889), the
court held sewer assessments valid on like reasoning. But in Wilson v. Chilcott,
21 P. 901 (Colo. 1889), the court held that special assessments for curbs and gutters were invalid based on the dictum about streets in Palmer v. Way. This decision was overruled and the Palmer dictum rejected in City of Denver v. Knowles,
30 P. 1041 (Colo. 1892), which sustained special assessments for curbs and streets
and distinguished them from property taxes subject to the uniformity rule. Later
the same year, voters amended article X, section 3 to exempt special assessments
from the uniformity rule "under provisions to be prescribed by law." See 1891
Colo. Sess. Laws 90; 3 MILLS' ANN. STAT. COLO. 64-67 (Supp. 1897). Article X,
section 3 was amended again in 1904, and the new version omitted any reference
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must be used exclusively for specific improvements that benefit
owners at least as much as the owners pay. 3 53 They are often
3 54
imposed within specially established improvement districts,
are subject to review by initiative and referendum, and are
3 55
sometimes imposed only upon majority consent.
Are special assessments taxes subject to TABOR? A reasonable case can be made for either answer. On the one hand,
they can be imposed without payers' consent and are always
imposed without at least dissenting payers' consent. And many
historical references to them call them taxes or use synonyms
for that term. 35 6 On the other hand, other references differentiate them from taxes. 3 57 And by definition they must benefit
payers at least as much as they pay. This feature of their legal
358
definition is more restrictive than the definition of fees,
which are not taxes under TABOR. Moreover, the supreme
court's lone relevant opinion supports their exclusion from
TABOR's requirements for taxes. 359 If so, they can be used by
TABOR enterprises.

to special assessments. See 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws 152-53; REV. STAT. COLO. 1908
at 44 (1908). However, in 1912 they reappeared as an express power of home-rule
municipalities. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6g. Since 1892, the supreme court has
sustained any special assessment that satisfied its requirements that improvements benefit payers at least as much as their payments and that payments be
used only for designated improvements. See Bloom v. City of Ft. Collins, 784 P.2d
304, 308 (Colo. 1989) (dictum); Zelinger v. City & County of Denver, 724 P.2d
1356, 1358-59 (Colo. 1986) (storm sewers); Reams v. City of Grand Junction, 676
P.2d 1189, 1193-95 (Colo. 1984) (roadway, curbs, and gutters).
353. See Bloom, 784 P.2d at 308; Zelinger, 724 P.2d at 1358-59; Reams, 676
P.2d at 1193-95.
354. See extensive governing statutes, COLO. REV. STAT. tit. 31, art. 25, parts
5-12 (2007).
355. See, e.g., Burks v. City of Lafayette, 349 P.2d 692 (Colo. 1960) (review by
referendum); City of Denver v. Knowles, 30 P. 1041 (Colo. 1892) (assessment
based on petition signed by majority of affected owners).
356. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Fort Collins, 281 P. 355, 358 (Colo. 1929).
357. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-15-709(1)(b) (2007).
358. See City of Littleton v. State, 855 P.2d 448, 451-52 (Colo. 1993); Bloom v.
City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 308-09 (Colo. 1989). Of course if the supreme
court should narrow the TABOR definition of fees, the statement in the text would
have to be adjusted accordingly.
359. See Campbell v. Orchard Mesa Irr. Dist., 972 P.2d 1037 (Colo. 1998). This
TABOR suit challenged actions by the irrigation district that would be financed
by special assessments. The supreme court held that the district was not an entity subject to TABOR because it served private interests, lacked public voting
characteristics, and had no power to tax. Its assessment power, based on majority
voting, was distinguished. Id. at 1039-41. See also infra note 373 and accompanying text.
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Ballot Titles and Election Notices

Other new TABOR litigation involved challenges to ballot
titles and election notices. A 1994 statute imposes a five-day
statute of limitations to challenge a ballot title, 360 and a 1992
statute imposes a ten-day limitation for election contests. 36 1 In
2001, the Eagle County School District held a successful election to increase the property tax mill levy. 362 Four months
later a taxpayer filed suit to challenge the ballot title and information. 363 The suit was dismissed as untimely, and the supreme court rejected claims that the 1994 statute violated
3 64
TABOR requirements.
A 2003 Colorado Springs city election to extend a dedicated
sales tax was challenged for TABOR violations. 36 5 The main
issue was whether extension of an existing tax constitutes a
"tax increase" for TABOR notice purposes. TABOR section (4)
expressly requires an election for "extension of an expiring
tax," 366 and the city did hold the required election. Section (3)
imposes detailed requirements for mailing an election notice to
voters, wording of the notice, and wording of the ballot title. 3 67
These require that the. mailed notice and the ballot title use
specified wording to describe a "tax increase." The city's notice
and title did not comply; the city argued that a tax extension
was not an "increase" for section (3) purposes. 368 The district
court disagreed and held that a tax extension is an increase for
section (3) purposes, but the supreme court reversed and sus369
tained the extension.
360. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-11-203.5(2)(2007). In Busse v. City of Golden, 73
P.3d 660, 663-64 (Colo. 2003), the court held that this statute barred an untimely
challenge based on the claim that the ballot title improperly included multiple,
separate purposes in a single measure. No constitutional issue was raised regarding the statute of limitations. On other issues in the case, see supra text at note
163; infra text at notes 386-92.
361. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-11-213 (2007).
362. Cacioppo v. Eagle County Sch. Dist. RE-50J, 92 P.3d 453, 457-58 (Colo.
2004).
363. Id. at 458.
364. Id. at 470.
365. Bruce v. City of Colo. Springs, 129 P.3d 988 (Colo. 2006). Plaintiff in the
case was Douglas Bruce, author of TABOR. Id. at 988.
366. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(a).
367. Id. at §§ 20(3)(b), (c).
368. Bruce, 129 P.3d at 991.
369. Id. at 996-97. Plaintiff challenged both the ballot title and mailed notice.
Id. at 990. The district court held that challenge to the title was time-barred un-

2007] COLORADO CONSTITUTION IN THE NEW CENTURY 1321
8.

What Is a TABOR "District"?

Other TABOR litigation concerned the kinds of governmental entities subject to TABOR limitations. Its section (2)(b)
applies TABOR to all "districts," defined as "the state or any local government, excluding enterprises." 3 70 Section (2)(d) defines an "enterprise" as "a government-owned business authorized to issue its own revenue bonds and receiving under 10% of
annual revenue" from state and local governments. 37 1 An earlier supreme court decision that arguably extended the reach of
TABOR held that a governmental entity that otherwise meets
the enterprise definition cannot qualify if it has taxing
372
power.
Another new case involved the other part of the TABOR
definition: what constitutes a "local government" for TABOR
purposes. The supreme court had held that an irrigation district was not subject to TABOR because it could not levy taxes
on the public and did not hold elections based on the concept of
one person, one vote. 37 3 In 2002 the court of appeals applied
the same criteria to determine that an urban renewal district
3 74
was not a TABOR "local government."
J.

Articles X and X1-TABOR and Debt
1.

Special Funds

During the economic downturn of 2001-04, the General
Assembly transferred more than $442,000,000 from thirty-one
special funds in the Treasury, known as "cash funds," into the

der Cacioppo, but there was no bar to the mailed notice challenge. Id. at 991, n. 2.
See supra notes 362-64 and accompanying text. A dissenting justice in the supreme court would have affirmed the district court's decision that a tax extension
is a tax increase. Bruce, 129 P.3d at 998 (Coats, J., dissenting).
370.

COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(2)(b).

371. Id. § 20(2)(d).
372. Nicholl v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 896 P.2d 859 (Colo. 1995). Dissenters read TABOR literally and would have sustained enterprise status for the E470 Authority (which had never used the taxing authority it had). Id. at 874-76.
In 1996, the General Assembly amended the governing statute to conform to the
decision by removing taxing power from public highway authorities. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 43-4-502(3) (2007).
373. Campbell v. Orchard Mesa Irr. Dist., 972 P.2d 1037 (Colo. 1998). See also
supra note 359 and accompanying text.
374. Olson v. City of Golden, 53 P.3d 747 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
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general fund in order to balance state budgets. 37 5 In 2004 several taxpayers sued the state, claiming that these transfers violated TABOR and debt limits in article XI. The court of appeals rejected most of their claims. 376 It first addressed the
somewhat novel question whether taxpayer standing allowed
suits to challenge fund shifts within the state treasury and
concluded that it did. 377 On the merits, the taxpayers' TABOR
claim asserted that the transfers were invalid because they
constituted a "new tax" or "tax policy change directly causing a
net tax revenue gain" requiring advance voter approval. 37 8 The
court rejected the claim, reasoning that fund shifts do not raise
revenue. 3 79 Plaintiffs argued that most of the cash funds had
been accumulated from fees, so that transferring them to the
general fund converted them to taxes and required voter approval under TABOR. 3 80 This claim appears to have some
force, and the court did not directly address it.381 Had the
claim succeeded, the court would have had to decide on a remedy. The most obvious would have been an injunction to forbid
the transfers at the outset, but that would have required a preliminary injunction. Another possibility would have been to

375. See Barber v. Ritter, 170 P.3d 763, 766-67 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). For specific examples, see 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 388-89 (Tobacco Litigation Settlement
Trust Fund, Employment Support Fund, & Unclaimed Property Trust Fund);
2003 Colo. Sess. Laws 1542-45 (six named funds). COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-75402(2)(b) (2007) defines "cash fund" as any fund "established by law for a specific
program or purpose." The constitution requires that each annual budget be balanced. Art. X, §§ 2, 16; art. XI, §§ 3-4. On the relation between the 2001-04
budget problems and TABOR, see supra text at notes 231-38.
376. Barber, 170 P.3d at 771-79. The district court rejected all claims. Id. at
766-67. Plaintiffs' counsel then unsuccessfully sought direct review in the supreme court. Barber v. Owens, No. 05SC279, 2005 Colo. LEXIS 501 (Colo. May
23, 2005).
377. Barber, 170 P.3d at 767-70. One judge dissented from this ruling. Id. at
779-81 (Hawthorne, J., dissenting). One plaintiff was held to lack standing to
bring a particular claim, but this did not affect the decision on the merits. See id.
at 770.
378. See COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(a).
379. Barber, 170 P.3d at 771-74 (extensively discussing decisions in other
states).
380. Id. at 771-74. Plaintiffs invoked the court's distinctions among taxes,
fees, and special assessments in Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304 (Colo.
1989), discussed supra, text accompanying notes 334-59. Id.
381. The court correctly noted that Bloom was decided before TABOR was
adopted, but the distinction between taxes and fees has more, not less, importance
under TABOR. See supratext at notes 336-37, 356-59.
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order repayment of the special funds after the fact, and this
was the remedy sought by the taxpayers' debt claim.
Plaintiffs' debt claim contended that the transfers created
an implied obligation to repay the money to the special funds, a
debt without new revenue to repay it in violation of article XI,
sections 3 and 4.382 The court rejected this claim for most of
the funds by determining that there was no obligation to repay. 383 Three of the funds had the word "trust" in their titles;
for these, the court held that it was unable to determine
whether public trusts had been created with legal restraints on
384
transfer, and this question was remanded to the trial court.
385
Both sides obtained review by the Colorado Supreme Court.
2.

Single Subject and Purpose Rules for Local Debt

Article XI, section 6(1) provides that no political subdivision of the state shall contract any general obligation debt except by a measure "specifying the purposes to which the funds
to be raised shall be applied" and "unless the question of incur3 86
ring the same be submitted to and approved by" its voters.
The supreme court has defined and enforced two limits derived
from this section, both discussed in a 2003 opinion reviewing a
bond election in Golden. 3 87 First, a local government cannot
spend bond proceeds for a purpose not stated in the ballot
measure. 38 8 Second, a measure to approve debt cannot submit
''separate and distinct purposes on a single ballot proposition,
on the theory that the voter is deprived of the right to vote for
one purpose and against others." 3 89 The opinion defined these

382. Barber, 170 P.3d at 774. Plaintiffs apparently argued as well that
TABOR's restriction on creation of new, multiple-fiscal year debt without advance
voter consent (COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(b)) was violated. The court briefly
cited this section but did not discuss its application. Barber, 170 P.3d at 771.
383. Id. at 779.
384. Id.

385.

Barber v. Ritter, No. 07SC373, 2007 Colo. LEXIS 1052 (Colo. Nov. 13,

2007).
386. COLO. CONST. art. XI, § 6(1). This provision was adopted in 1970. For
municipalities it replaced original article XI, section 8, which had the same requirements. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 274-75.
387. Busse v. City of Golden, 73 P.3d 660 (Colo. 2003). On other issues in the
case, see supra notes 163, 360 and text accompanying them.
388. Id. at 665-66. Despite the specific language in section 6(1), the opinion
did not tie this requirement to it.
389. Id. at 665.
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rules in favor of a local government's broad discretion, 3 90 but
precedents
had enforced both under the predecessor of section
6(l). 3 9 1
These rules do not have wide application because article
XI, section 6 covers only general obligation debt and excepts
borrowing for water projects, and governments often elect to
borrow in other forms. 392 However, most government debt of
every kind must now have the voter approval required by
TABOR. 3 93 This raises the question whether either of these
limits will be read into TABOR. The question has not arisen in
a reported case and perhaps never will arise because of
394
TABOR's detailed specifications for ballot measures.
K. Article XVIII-Term Limits
Colorado voters' affection for term limits 3 95 generated two
recent constitutional events. The first involved district attorneys. In 1990, voters amended the Constitution by citizens' initiative to impose term limits on members of the General Assembly and on state-level executive officials. 39 6
A 1994
amendment imposed term limits on every "nonjudicial elected
official of any county, city and county, city, town, school district, service authority, or any other political subdivision of the

390. Id. at 665-66. The case was remanded for trial on these issues.
391. City & County of Denver v. Hallett, 83 P. 1066 (Colo. 1905); City of Denver v. Hayes, 63 P. 311 (Colo. 1900) (both based on former art. XI, § 8 (repealed
1970)). See McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 209 P.2d 910 (Colo. 1949)
(same ruling based on Denver charter rather than art. XI, § 8). Cf. Abts v. Bd. of
Educ., 622 P.2d 518, 523-25 (Colo. 1980) (school bond issue did not violate art. XI,
§ 6(1)).
392. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 273-75. Article XI, section
6(1) expressly allows home-rule municipalities to opt out of its election requirement by charter. (The exception does not exclude them from the purposes requirement.) The exception was likely inserted because the home-rule amendment
expressly authorizes covered municipalities to issue bonds "upon the vote of the
taxpaying electors.
. . as may by the charter be provided." COLO. CONST. art.
XX, § 1. However, when municipal charters have provisions like section 6(1),
similar issues are raised. See Busse, 73 P.3d at 665; McNichols, 209 P.2d at 91115; People v. Graham, 203 P. 277, 278 (Colo. 1921) (Boulder charter).
393. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(b). See Submission of Interrogatories on H.B.
99-1325, 979 P.2d 549, 556-59 (Colo. 1999).
394. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(3), (4)(b).
395. See generally OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 359-66.
396. COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 1(2); art. V, § 3(2) (limiting consecutive terms, not
total number of terms). The same measure attempted to impose term limits on
Colorado's members of Congress and senators.
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State" and on members of the State Board of Education and
Regents of the University of Colorado. 39 7
However, the
amendment empowered "voters of any such political subdivi3 98
sion" to alter or abolish the limits.
Neither amendment specifically applied to district attorneys, and opponents (notably the district attorneys themselves)
argued that they were not limited. Term limits advocates argued that DAs are officials of judicial districts, which are
within the amendment's coverage of "any other political subdivision of the State." The issue was married to voting by the
provision authorizing local voters to alter or abolish term limits, and this became the focus of its resolution. 39 9 In 2001, the
Pueblo County Commissioners referred a measure to the ballot
to exempt the Tenth Judicial District Attorney from term limits. 40 0 This was formally possible because the Tenth District is
coterminous with Pueblo County, and it was practically possible because the local DA, Gus Sandstrom, was extremely popular. 40 1 But Secretary of State Donetta Davidson would have
none of it and ordered the county clerk not to put the measure
on the ballot. 40 2 The clerk disobeyed the order, and the measure went to a vote and was approved by a large margin. Davidson declared the vote void and refused to recognize it.
Sandstrom and other Pueblo County officials and residents
sued Davidson, seeking a declaratory judgment that DAs were
not subject to term limits, or in the alternative that the referral
and vote were valid to exempt the Tenth District DA. While
the case was pending, the General Assembly referred a measure to the 2002 state ballot to try to resolve the uncertainty by
397. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 11(1) (limiting consecutive terms, not total
number of terms). See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 361-66.
398. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 11(2).
399. A 2000 opinion of Attorney General Salazar sided with term limits proponents, but the opinion did not consider the problems created by the voting provision. See Op. Att'y Gen., No. 2000-2, 2000 Colo. AG LEXIS 2.
400. For facts in this and the next paragraph, see Davidson v. Sandstrom, 83
P.3d 648, 651-55 (Colo. 2004).
401. Sandstrom's popularity was manifested by the fact that, to insure his exemption from term limits, plaintiffs in the lawsuit included the county chairs of
both major political parties. See id. at 653.
402. Davidson relied principally on the lack of any statute authorizing county
commissioners to place judicial district matters on the ballot. See id. at 653 n. 3.
Except for home-rule counties, commissioners have no general power to refer proposals to the ballot. However, pursuant to statutes and TABOR, they can and
must refer tax, debt, and spending measures to the ballot. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 29-2-103 to 105, 30-26-301 (2007).
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specifying that DAs were not subject to term limits, but voters
trounced the measure. 40 3 The following February, the Pueblo
District Court held that DAs are subject to term limits under
the 1994 amendment, but the referral and vote to exempt the
Tenth District DA were valid. The next year, the supreme
40 4
court affirmed both rulings.
To find DAs within the 1994 amendment, the Court had to
interpret two phrases. First, is a DA a "nonjudicial elected official"? Second, are judicial districts "political subdivisions of the
State"? In one of those infuriatingly simplistic opinions, the
court's majority asserted that the "plain meaning" of the
amendment answered both questions affirmatively, with citations to dictionaries. 40 5 The concurring opinion disagreed on
both issues and showed that the meaning was anything but
plain. 406 If one reads the amendment's language with no eye
on voters' intent, the concurrence made a very persuasive case
on the "political subdivisions" issue 40 7 and a reasonable case on
the "nonjudicial" question. 40 8 However, if voters' intent is considered, the majority came out well ahead. There is little doubt
that the amendment's purpose included DAs; as is often the
case with initiatives, the ambiguity arose from careless draft9
ing. 40
On the question of the election's validity, the Court held
that the 1994 amendment's provision for local voters to amend
term limits is self-executing and gave the supervisors implied
403. See Sandstrom, 83 P.3d at 653.
404. Id. at 652, 660.
405. Id. at 655, 656.
406. Id. at 661-63 (Hobbs, J., joined by Coats, J., concurring in the judgment).
The opinion was a concurrence rather than a dissent because Sandstrom won under either view.
407. As the opinion argued, political subdivisions usually have governing bodies, taxing authority, and several other attributes that judicial districts lack. Id.
at 662.
408. The argument on this point was based on the constitutional structure,
placing state executive officials in article IV, local executive officials in articles
XIV and XX, and judges and DAs in article VI. Id. at 661-62.
409. The attorney general's opinion, supra note 399, detailed the ballot review
process in which initiative proponents added language to include Regents and the
State Board of Education. No one thought of the DA issue, but the process made
broad intent apparent. Of course, it is voters' intent that counts, not drafters'.
See, e.g., Zaner v. City of Brighton, 917 P.2d 280, 283 (Colo. 1996). However,
when the 1994 ballot title and Blue Book used the phrase "any political subdivision of the state," voters surely understood the measure to be comprehensive. See
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, RESEARCH PUB. No. 392,
ANALYSIS OF 1994 BALLOT PROPOSALS.
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authority to refer the issue to the ballot. For judicial districts
in more than one county, the court said that supervisors of all
affected counties could (concurrently) refer a measure. 4 10 This
part of the court's opinion abandoned reliance on allegedly
plain meaning and embraced voters' intent, augmented by the
4 11
general policy in favor of allowing voters to have their say.
An issue the decision left open is whether, absent a statute, the
initiative power is available to put DAs' term limits to a vote.
The court's expansive language implies that the power should
be available, but lack of statutory procedures is a greater ob4 12
stacle for initiated measures than for referred.
Other events concerning term limits arose in 2004. Legislators unhappy with some judicial decisions proposed a constitutional amendment to impose term limits and several other
restraints on Colorado judges. 4 13 The measure would have limited judicial terms for all state judges to four years and barred
service after twelve, 4 14 but it was not adopted by the General
Assembly. In 2006 a measure to impose term limits on appellate judges only was proposed as a citizens' initiative. 4 15 Its
most striking feature was retroactivity; it would have forced
out five of seven supreme court justices and seven of nineteen
court of appeals judges in 2008.416 The measure qualified for
4 17
the ballot but was defeated.

410. Davidson, 83 P.3d at 658.
411. See id. at 658-59.
412. See COLO. REV. STAT. tit. 1, art. 40 and tit. 31, art. 11 (2007) (procedures
for, respectively, statewide and municipal initiatives and referendums).
413. See S. Con. Res. 04-007, 64th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2004).
414. Id.
415. See
Colorado
Ballot
Proposal
2005-2006
#90,
http://www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/0506initrefr.nsf/dac42lef79ad243487256def0067c1d
e/7e314af66b4569cc8725711e00583b31?OpenDocument (last visited June 7, 2007)
[hereinafter Colorado Ballot Proposal #90]. Colorado's term limits on elected officials restrict only consecutive terms, supra notes 396-97, while this proposal limited total as well as consecutive terms.
416. See Colorado Ballot Proposal #90, supra note 415.
417. 2006 Initiative 40, http://www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf/ (last
visited June 7, 2007).
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L. Article XX-Local Home Rule
1.

Cases

The Colorado Constitution provides home-rule cities and
towns with immunity from the General Assembly's control for
"local and municipal matters. '4 18 Since adoption of this homerule provision in 1902, the supreme court has wrestled with its
application often, though hardly consistently. 4 19 The court's
current doctrine first determines whether a contested matter is
within municipal competence at all or is a matter of exclusively
statewide concern. 420 Most decisions sustain municipal competence. 4 2 1 The next issue is whether the subject is exclusively
local or is of mixed state and local concern. 422 For this question, the court applies a four-part test adopted in 1990:
whether the subject calls for statewide uniformity, external effects of a municipal regulation, the history of activity in the
particular field, and specific constitutional provisions allocating
authority over the subject. 4 23 At least one recent decision adds
a criterion of deferring to ardent declarations of the General
Assembly. 4 24 If the subject is of mixed concern, the court then
determines whether state and local laws conflict, a question
4 25
sometimes stated as whether state law preempts local.
Some opinions change the order and address preemption before
4 26
home rule.
Since 2000, a number of decisions have applied these criteria to home-rule issues. The first involved photo radar and redlight cameras. In 1997 the General Assembly passed a detailed
statute restricting and regulating use of these devices in traffic
enforcement, and more restrictions were added in 1999.427
Commerce City, Westminster, Fort Collins, and Colorado
418. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
419. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 393-94.
420. See City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 155 (Colo. 2003).
421. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 394.
422. See Ibarra,62 P.3d at 155.
423. See City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 768 (Colo. 1990).
424. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 37 (Colo.
2000) (awarding legislature's declaration "great weight").
425. See id. at 35-37.
426. See, e.g., id.
427. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 42-3-113(10), 42-4-110.5 (2007). Current § 42-3113(10) was contained in § 42-3-112 prior to 2005, and § 42-4-110.5 includes other
amendments added in 2002 and 2004. See id.
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Springs sued the state of Colorado in Denver District Court,
claiming that some of the regulations invaded their constitutional home-rule powers. 4 28 The district court sustained almost all of the statute, and the supreme court affirmed. 4 29 The
challenged provisions restrict the penalties cities can impose,
require signs to be posted notifying drivers that devices are in
use, and prohibit contracts with vendors of radar and cameras
4 30
where the contracts base compensation on fines recovered.
The court applied its home-rule tests and determined that the
subject matter was of mixed state and local concern, so conflict431
ing local laws were preempted by the state statute.
In a second home-rule case, a Northglenn city ordinance
prohibited two registered sex offenders from living together if
they were unrelated or unmarried. 432 When the ordinance took
effect, Juliana and Eusebio Ibarra were foster parents to four
unrelated foster children, three of whom had been both perpetrators and victims of incest and were registered sex offenders.
433 Juliana Ibarra was charged and convicted of a criminal violation of the Northglenn ordinance. 434 A sharply divided Colorado Supreme Court overturned the conviction, reaching the
unusual conclusion that the subject matter was of exclusively
statewide concern, beyond the reach of municipal law regardless of any conflict with state law. 4 35 Three dissenters argued
that the subject was of mixed state and local concern and that
there was no conflict between state and local law. 4 36 It is hard
to escape the inference that the decision was driven by the
case's unusual facts.
The next case was easier. The town of Frisco approved an
application for development of a tract of land within the

428. City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1276 (Colo. 2002).
429. Id. The district court struck down a requirement of personal service of
process on grounds of separation of powers and violating authority granted to the
judiciary, and the state did not appeal. Id. at 1277 n.13.
430. See id. at 1276.
431. Id. at 1279-85. Chief Justice Mullarkey dissented, arguing that traffic
enforcement is a local and municipal subject, as older decisions had held. Id. at
1285-86.
432. City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 153 (Colo. 2003).
433. Id. at 153-54.
434. Id. at 154.
435. See id. at 163. To reach its statewide-only conclusion, the court applied
the factors it usually employs to decide whether an issue is local or mixed state
and local. See id. at 160-63; supra text accompanying notes 423-24.
436. Id. at 163-64 (Coats, J., dissenting, joined by Kourlis and Rice, JJ.).
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town. 4 37 Harry Baum lived next door and filed suit to overturn
the decision in Summit County District Court. 4 38 The district
court dismissed the suit because Frisco's home-rule charter
gave the municipal court "exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters arising under this Charter, the ordinances, and
other enactments of the Town," which included Baum's
claims. 43 9 The Colorado Supreme Court unanimously sided
with the town. 440 Because the Colorado Constitution specifically authorizes home-rule municipalities to establish courts
and define their jurisdiction, the Frisco court had exclusive,
original jurisdiction over Baum's claims. 4 1 The court held that
442
the subject matter was one of exclusively local concern.
However, the court also held that there was no conflict between
state and local law, and it said in dictum that "it is possible
that a claimant would be justified in filing in district court if
s/he reasonably believed that the matter was of state or mixed
concern." 44 3 Presumably a mixed case could begin in either
district or municipal court; otherwise, litigants would have to
determine in advance whether a case is local or mixed, which is
often a difficult issue.
Perhaps the most interesting home-rule case of recent
years involved a conflict between Denver's ordinance banning
pit bull terriers and a state statute intended to overturn it.
Denver's ordinance was enacted in 1989 and was sustained
against various legal attacks in 1991. 4 At that time there
was no conflicting state law, but in 2004, the General Assembly
passed a statute specifically intended to overturn breed-specific

437. Town of Frisco v. Baum, 90 P.3d 845, 846 (Colo. 2004).
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 847, 850 (citing COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6).
442. Id. at 850 n.6.
443. Id. at 849 & n.4. As the court noted, if Frisco had no municipal court,
Baum could have filed in district court, and in the actual case, he had a right of
appeal from municipal to district court. Id. at 850. The former proposition arises
from the express terms of article XX, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution, under
which municipal law supersedes state law only in case of conflict. COLO. CONST.
art. XX, § 6.
444. Colo. Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 820 P.2d 644, 646
(Colo. 1991). The court rejected claims based on substantive due process, equal
protection, and taking of property. Id. at 650, 652, 654. By a 4-3 vote, it did overturn a provision placing the burden of proof of breed on dog owners. Id. at 648,
654.
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ordinances like Denver's. 44 5 Denver sued the state, claiming
that the statute unconstitutionally invaded Denver's home-rule
powers. The district court held against the state except for
preemption of Denver's regulation of inter-city transportation
of pit bulls. 44 6 Several months later, the court held a hearing
on the state's claim that new knowledge since 1991 had undermined the rationality of the pit bull ban and concluded that
the state failed to prove its claim. 44 7 The state filed an appeal
44 8 Still
of the first ruling but later dismissed it voluntarily.
44 9
another attack on the Denver ordinance was filed in 2007.
Another decision arose out of one more conflict between
Denver and the state. After the courts sustained Denver's gun
control laws against right-to-bear-arms claims, 4 50 gun advocates persuaded the General Assembly to enact statutes in
2003 setting statewide standards for permits to carry concealed
weapons and preempting all municipal ordinances that regulate guns more strictly than state or federal laws. 4 5 1 Denver
sued the state on home-rule grounds, and in November 2004,
the district court held in favor of the city and county, sustaining almost all its ordinances as matters of exclusively local concern under article XX, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution.

4 52

Home rule became entangled with eminent domain in a
case from Telluride. In 2002, the town filed an action to condemn a large parcel of land outside the town and abutting its
445. See COLO. REV. STAT. §18-9-204.5(1)(b), (5) (2007) (2004 amendments to
18-9-204.5).
446. City & County of Denver v. State, No. 04CV3756 (Denver Dist. Ct. Dec. 9,
2004). See also Denver Animal Care & Control, Pit Bull Ban Upheld (Apr. 8,

2005),
http://www.denvergov.org/AnimalControllFrequentlyAskedQuestions/FrequentlyA
skedQuestionsl/tabid/377943/Default.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2007).
447. See id.
448. See City & County of Denver v. State, No. 05-CA-000149 (Colo. Ct. App.
July 18, 2005) (order dismissing appeal). A member of the American Canine
Foundation unsuccessfully appealed denial of her attempt to intervene in the
case. See City & County of Denver v. Grebing, No. 04CA2543, 2006 Colo. App.
LEXIS 1368 (Colo. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2006).
449. Dias v. City & County of Denver, No. 07CV0722 (Denver Dist. Ct.).
450. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
451. See COLO. REV. STAT. tit. 18, art. 12, part 2; tit. 29, art. 11.7; § 30-10-523
(2007) (2003 amendments of 30-10-523); Daniel Mauser Memorial Web Site, Colorado
Gun
Watch:
Gun
Lobby
Wins
Big
in
2003
Session,
http://www.danielmauser.com/ColoradoGuns.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2007).
452. City & County of Denver v. State, No. 03-CV-3809 (Denver Dist. Ct. Nov.
5, 2004), affd by equally divided court, 139 P.3d 635 (Colo. 2006).
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eastern border at the mouth of Telluride Canyon. The landowner obtained support from the 2004 General Assembly,
which passed a statute removing the power of municipalities to
condemn land outside their borders except for utilities purposes. 4 53 In the condemnation action, the San Miguel District
Court held the statute an invalid invasion of Telluride's homerule powers and rejected other defenses to the action. 4 54 The
case went to a jury verdict on valuation of the land. The jury
favored the landowner's valuation, but the town came up with
the funds to meet the verdict. The landowner then appealed
45 5
based on the 2004 statute.
The eminent domain power of home-rule municipalities is
specifically defined in section 1 of article XX: A home-rule city
or town "shall have the power, within or without its territorial
limits, to construct, condemn and purchase . . . water works,
light plants, power plants, transportation systems, heating
plants, and any other public utilities or works or ways local in
use and extent... for public use by right of eminent domain..
"456
The 2004 statute restricting municipalities' extraterritorial eminent domain specifically allows the power for
"water works, light plants, power plants, transportation systems, heating plants and any other public utilities or public
works" and specifically disallows the power for "parks, recreation, open space, conservation, preservation of views or scenic
vistas, or for similar purposes. ' 457 Therefore, the legislature
attempted to restrict the power to the greatest extent of its authority under article XX section 1. Unless the courts interpret
section l's general phrase "and other public utilities or works
or ways local in use and extent" broadly enough to encompass
Telluride's purpose, the town seems likely to lose its pending
appeal. Two precedents relied on by the district court appear
458
to be distinguishable.

453. 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 1748 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-101(4)
(2007)). See supra text at notes 139-42.
454. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., No. 04CV22 (San Miguel
Dist. Ct. Oct. 6, 2004), appealpending, Colo. Sup. Ct. No. 07SA101.
455. See Bruce V. Bigelow, Setback for S.D. Industrialist,SAN DIEGO UNIONat
available
TRIBUNE,
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20070510/newslb lOblue.html.
456. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1.
457. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-101(4)(b) (2007).
458. In City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irr. Co., 575 P.2d 382 (Colo.
1978), the court sustained Thornton's power to condemn water rights contrary to
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2.

Home-Rule Doctrine

The court's home-rule doctrine is appropriate as far as it
goes, but it could be improved in three important ways. First,
other states have expressly recognized that local control is least
appropriate for regulation of private markets and relationships. 459 The theoretical basis for this proposition is at least as
old as Federalist No. 10, explaining the problem of oppression
by local majorities. 460 Conversely, local control is most appropriate for municipal operations, where market forces and revenue limits discipline governments. 46 1 Harder cases arise over
public safety issues, where private behavior poses an arguable
danger to others. 46 2 Colorado decisions fit these categories but
463
without any express recognition of them.
The second improvement would be to adopt an explicit rule
of clear statement for state preemption of local control over
subjects of mixed state and local competence that directly involve local governments. In these situations, the state is free to
make its intent clear by amending the governing law. In the
meantime, local governments should have freedom to experiment and compete. The U.S. Supreme Court has applied such

a state statute, but Thornton's purpose was within the specific public utilities
right guaranteed by article XX, section 1. In City and County of Denver v. Board
of Commissioners, 156 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1945), the court sustained Denver's power
to condemn land for an airport. A state statute allowed such condemnation
within five miles of a municipality, but most of the land Denver took was outside
that boundary. However, the statute was phrased as a grant of power, not as a
prohibition, and an airport is closer to a utility than is Telluride's purpose. Moreover, both decisions antedated the court's adoption of its modern structure for
home rule based on mixed state-local questions, which Telluride's action appears
to involve.
459. See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
135-37 (2d ed. 2001) and cases cited. In some states, the distinction appears in
the organic home-rule law itself. See, e.g., CHR General, Inc. v. City of Newton,
439 N.E.2d 788, 790 (Mass. 1982).
460. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
461. See e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Colo. Lodge # 27 v. City & County of
Denver, 926 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1996) (deputy sheriffs' training); City & County of
Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 768-69, 771 (Colo. 1990) (municipal employee residence); 1 ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW §13.02[2] (2d ed. 1999) (control of
municipal property).
462. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 444-52 (discussing pit bull and
gun control issues).
463. See, e.g., Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30,
39 (Colo. 2000) (town's affordable housing plan involved mixed state-local question that state could override).
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a rule for federal preemption of state law. 464 For similar policy
reasons, the Colorado Supreme Court should do likewise. For a
third change, the court should abandon its rulings that purport
to defer to declarations of the General Assembly on the constitutional criteria for home rule. 4 65 The standard ought to be the
same, with or without self-serving declarations. Giving the
General Assembly extra weight for the strength of its desire is
inappropriate double counting.
M. Schedule
Colorado's 1876 Constitutional Convention appended to its
draft constitution twenty-two sections under the heading of
Schedule. These were transitional measures to ease conversion
from territory to state. 4 66 Most of them are plainly obsolete,
and only two reported judicial decisions have referred to
them. 46 7 However, none has been repealed, despite numerous
measures purging other obsolete provisions. 4 68 In 2007, a section of the Schedule suddenly became relevant. A bill in the
legislature would have added Colorado to a national plan to
award electoral college votes to the presidential candidate who
receives the largest popular vote. 4 69 This appeared to conflict
with Schedule section 20, which states, "The general assembly
shall provide that after the year eighteen hundred and seventysix the electors of the electoral college shall be chosen by direct
vote of the people." 4 70 The bill did not pass, 4 7 1 but it could be
reintroduced in future sessions. Whether section 20 would
have invalidated it raised at least two issues. First, should section 20 be interpreted as a continuing requirement, or was it

464. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973). However, the Court is far from consistent on this point. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 147, § 9.4.
465. See supra note 424 and accompanying text.
466. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 438.
467. Packer v. People, 8 P. 564 (Colo. 1885); Wilson v. People, 3 Colo. 325
(1877). See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 1, at 438.
468. See, e.g., supra note 8 and accompanying text.
469. See S.B. 07-046, 66th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2007).
470. COLO. CONST. schedule § 20.
Colo.
Gen.
Assembly,
Bill
Folders,
471. See
http://www.leg.state.co.us/Clics/Clics2007A/csl.nsf/BillFoldersSenate?openFrames
et (last visited Aug. 28, 2007) (by "Agreement Elect Pres Popular Vote," follow hyperlink to "History").
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satisfied when the legislature first complied with it?472 The
wording appears to be ongoing, but because it was part of the
transitional Schedule, the latter interpretation is plausible.
Second, if it is a continuing requirement, is the Schedule an enforceable part of the constitution? It appears to be. It was part
47 3
of the text voted on at the convention and ratified by voters.
474
The Colorado Supreme Court has treated it as law.
CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the flashy issues of 2006, Colorado's most
important constitutional events since 2001 involved measures
to adjust TABOR restraints on state government and court
contests over TABOR and municipal home rule. A major issue
for the immediate future is whether to make significant
changes in the state's initiative method of lawmaking.

472. The statutes passed to carry out the Schedule provision were and are less
explicit. See GEN'L LAWS COLO. § 933 (1877) (presidential electors "shall be
elected"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-301 (2007) (same).
473. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION HELD IN DENVER,
DECEMBER 20, 1875, To FRAME A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF COLORADO
703-07, 736 (1907).
474. See Packer v. People, 8 P. 564, 566 (Colo. 1885); Wilson v. People, 3 Colo.
325, 330-31 (Colo. 1877).
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